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Friel: Porn by Any Other Name? A Constitutional Alternative to Regulatin

PORN BY ANY OTHER NAME?
A CONSTITUTIONAL ALTERNATIVE
TO REGULATING "VICTIMLESS"
COMPUTER-GENERATED CHILD
PORNOGRAPHY
Every major technological innovation goes through several phases
before it can be assimilatedby a culture. At first it is externalized in
an artificialsetting such as a stage, a page, a screen, or any other
display technology. Second it works its way into the psyche of the user
even as its user interacts with it one way or another. When itfinally
penetrates the user during the course of the last stage of assimilation,
it becomes a psychological reality, it becomes the normal way of
being, of thinking, of feeling, of living.'

I.

INTRODUCTION

Smith2 earns his living by creating child pornography, using as his subjects
young children between the ages of five and fourteen. Although he has no
sexual attraction to the children, he has found that he can make good money by
selling pictures of himself engaging in various types of sexual intercourse with
children; so he does not mind molesting children in order to make a profit. It
is very easy for him to have access to children, by virtue of his job as a
custodian at a grade school. Over the past five years, he has had sexual
intercourse with over 200 children and his business has earned him over
$500,000. As evidence of his many encounters with various children, Smith has
his garage filled with videocassettes and still photographs that he has developed
in his own darkroom.
Jones is a pedophile who enjoys looking at pictures of children engaging in
sexual intercourse. Although he has never molested a child himself, he has
filled his basement with thousands of pictures of other people molesting young
children. He has purchased these pictures from various contacts that he has
made over the years. The pictures are mostly Polaroids and those obtained from
low-quality magazines. Jones has also stored thousands of child pornography

1. Susan Wyshynski & Vincent J. Vincent, Full-Body Unencumbered Immersion in Virtual
Worlds, in VIRTUAL REALITY: APPLICATIONS AND EXPLORATIONS 123, 144 (Alan Wexelblat ed.,
1993) (quoting Derrick de Kerkhove, co-director of the Marshall McLuhan Program).
2. The three scenarios presented here are all hypothetical.
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images on his computer's hard drive, images that he obtained in various ways.
Some of these images he purchased from friends as files on floppy disks.
Others he obtained by e-mail or by downloading them from various sources on
the Internet. 3 Jones has never inquired as to how these pictures were created.
He has always assumed that the producers photographed real children while the
children were engaging in sexual activities, but this has never bothered him.
Johnson is an out-of-work computer graphics designer. He, too, realizes
the market potential in selling child pornography, but the idea of actually
molesting a child disgusts him. He has no sexual interest in young children, but
he desires to earn some fast cash. One day, he decides to use his skills to create
"virtual child pornography" 4 on his computer. Computer users can create this
form of pornography without actually sexually abusing any children.5 Johnson
simply cuts out a picture of a thirteen-year-old girl from a Montgomery Ward6
catalog and uses a scanner to turn it into a digitized image on his computer.
He then combines the image of the girl's face with an image of an adult woman
that he has obtained from Penthouse magazine, and the end results are several
pornographic images of the girl, each one showing her in a different sexual
pose. Johnson then transfers the images to a computer disk and sells the disk
to an undercover police officer, who was posing as a collector of child
pornography.
At first glance, all of these men appear to be trafficking child pornography.
Smith's actions may seem more reprehensible because he engaged in the
depicted sex acts. Some may argue that Jones's ignorance as to the production
of his pictures offers him a legal defense. But a more interesting issue is
whether Johnson can be convicted of creating or selling child pornography,
when no real child was ever sexually exploited in the production of the images
that he sold. To answer this question, it is necessary to know exactly what child
pornography is and is not. This Note considers whether Johnson's images are
truly child pornography within the Supreme Court's definition.
This Note argues that, although current child pornography statutes need to
be amended to address the issue of computer-generated pornography, statutes
that merely equate virtual pornography with traditional child pornography
provide superficial solutions and are unconstitutional under the First

3.
4.
5.
6.

For a brief explanation of the Internet, see infra note 29.
See infra note 30.
See infra note 32 and accompanying text.
For an explanation of this procedure, see infra notes 32-42 and accompanying text.
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Amendment. 7
A recent amendment to federal legislation addresses the
problems presented by the new technology, but it ignores the unique properties
of child pornography which allow it to be regulated.' The conduct required to
create child pornography involves actual child abuse. 9 The Supreme Court
noted this in New York v. Ferber when it denied child pornography any First
Amendment protection."0 However, virtual child pornography generated by
computer graphics programs does not involve child abuse, thus it does not fall
into the narrow category of unprotected speech that the Court recognized in
Ferber.
This Note proposes that, in criminal prosecutions for the possession or
production of child pornography," federal law should allow a rebuttable
presumption so that an image that appears to depict a real child engaged in
sexual conduct will be considered child pornography. The effect of this
presumption will be that, if an image appears on its face to be child
pornography, the prosecutor will not be required to actually prove that the image
depicts a real child engaging in sexual activity. This presumption will shift the
burden to the defendant to prove, as an affirmative defense, 2 that the image
is virtual pornography and that no child was sexually abused in its production.
This presumption would keep the prosecutor's burden of proof within acceptable
limits 3 and allow the enforcement of the federal child pornography laws to
continue with full force. This result would be due to the fact that habitual child
pornographers, who tend to have hundreds or even thousands of pictures in their
collections, " will have to carry the burden of proving that each image in
question did not involve the sexual abuse of a child in its production.

7. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press .... "). For a background discussion of First Amendment principles, see infra notes
47-53 and accompanying text.
8. Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252 (1996). See infra notes
96-98 and accompanying text.
9. "Child pornography necessarily includes the sexual abuse of a real child, and there can be
no understanding of the special problem of child pornography until there is understanding of the
special way in which child pornography is child abuse." U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, AT'Y GEN.
COMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY: FINAL REPORT 406 (1986) [hereinafter REPORT]. Child pornography
is a recording of a child's sexual abuse. Id. at 411. See infra notes 240-41 and accompanying text.
10. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982).
11. This note will propose an alternative amendment to the Child Pornography Prevention Act
of 1996. See generally part V.
12. The amendment to the federal statute that is proposed in this note specifies the burden of
proof as clear and convincing evidence. See infra notes 381-91 and accompanying text.
13. Many states, such as Illinois, still require the prosecutor to actually prove that the
pornographic material in question actually depicts a real child engaged in sexual conduct. See, e.g.,
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-20.1 (West 1996).
14. The desire to have a large collection of pornographic pictures of children is a common
characteristic of pedophiles. REPORT, supra note 9, at 407.
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Therefore, those defendants who can prove that no child was harmed in
making the images in question may have a limited affirmative defense, such as
However, this defense may only be
the one proposed later in this Note. 5
used sparingly, in limited circumstances. Introducing such an affirmative
defense into the federal child pornography legislation will ensure that the law
does not reach beyond the purpose underlying the prohibition of child
pornography, namely the prevention of the sexual abuse of children. Presently,
the Child Pornography Act 6 establishes an irrebuttable presumption that an
image is child pornography, but such a presumption has a chilling effect on
constitutionally protected speech, such as virtual child pornography. 7 The
affirmative defense contained in the amendment proposed in this Note will
therefore serve to keep the federal legislation narrowly-tailored so as to
withstand constitutional scrutiny under the First Amendment. Ignoring the
distinction between real child pornography and virtual child pornography
unconstitutionally expands beyond the narrow class of unprotected speech
created in Ferber. The overbroad definition of child pornography recently
adopted might also punish an otherwise innocent defendant who may have one
or two computer-generated"' images on his computer, but no intention to ever
molest a child.' 9
Section II of this Note will provide a background of the new computer
graphics technology, as well as a brief historical background of First
Amendment law as it relates to child pornography. 20 Section II also contains
a background of the Child Pornography Act of 1996, a statute which is central
to the discussion of this Note. 2' Section III will discuss the potential effects
of new computer technology on the child pornography industry.2 2 Section IV
will analyze constitutional and other legal issues surrounding child pornography
legislation. After discussing the government's interest in protecting the child
subjects of pornography, this Section analyzes the constitutional requirement that

15. See generally part V.
16. See infra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 19, 225 and accompanying text.
18. Computer-generated images refers to images that have been computer-enhanced or
computer-manipulated by using one of the methods discussed later in this note. See generally notes
32-42 and accompanying text.
19. According to Alan Dershowitz, "[T]he vast majority of people who get their jollies from
watching kids have sex do not themselves engage in sex with children." Alan Dershowitz,
Commentary, L.A. TIMEs, June 6, 1996, at B7. See infra notes 297-304. Legislation such as the
Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 will criminalize the private activities of many computer
users who will never engage in acts of sexual abuse. Ronald W. Adelman, The Constitutionality of
Congressional Efforts to Ban Computer-Generated Child Pornography: A First Amendment
Assessment of S. 1237, 14 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L.J. 483, 491 (1996).
20. See infra part II.A and II.B.
21. See infra part II.C.
22. See infra part III.
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the statutes be narrowly and reasonably drawn so as not to restrict free speech
which is unrelated to this interest. 23 Next, this Section will highlight the legal
assumptions of the Child Pornography Act of 1996 in light of the Ferber
decision to determine whether the legislation can pass a constitutional attack
based on the First Amendment. 24 Additionally, Section IV will briefly address
the "secondary effect" argument against pornography, and how this issue should
be resolved when it comes to drafting legislation to respond to virtual child
pornography.2 Section V26 will propose an amendment to the federal child
way to address
pornography statute27 which will include a realistic
28
technological change in the child pornography industry.
II.BACKGROUND
Before the constitutionality of any prohibitions on virtual child pornography
can be analyzed, one must begin by examining the contemporary technological,
legal and social backgrounds in which this type of pornography will exist. First,
this Section provides an introduction to the computer graphics technology which
pornographers will use to create virtual child pornography. After this will come
a treatment of the legal background, including the relevant case law, followed
by an exploration of the recent amendment to the federal child pornography
legislation.
A. Computer Graphics Technology and Child Pornography
As with many other areas of criminal law, new computer technologies,
29
Some
including the Internet, have influenced the child pornography industry.

23. See infra part IV.
24. See infra part IV.
25. See infra part IV.
26. See infra part V.
27. 18 U.S.C. §2252 (1996).
28. See infra part V.
29. The Internet is a vast computer network which extends worldwide. PAUL GILSTER, THE
INTERNET NAVIGATOR 13 (1993). Science-fiction writer William Gibson, who coined the word
.cyberspace," described the technological forum of Internet, or "matrix," as "a consensual
hallucination experienced daily by billions of legitimate operators, in every nation ... a graphic
representation of data abstracted from the bank of every computer in the human system.
Unthinkable complexity. Lines of light ranged in the nonspace of the mind, clusters and
constellations of data. Like city lights receding." WILLIAM GIBSON, NEUROMANCER 51 (1984).
The Internet has complicated the enforcement of child pornography laws, particularly bulletin board
services (or "BBS," which allow users to download images after paying a "membership fee"; users
are also usually allowed to upload their own files to the service), inter-relay chats (IRCs, which
allow "real-time chatting" between users who can choose between public "rooms," which are filled
with many users and are usually dedicated to a particular topic-for example, tennis, politics, or
bestiality-or private channels which allow one-on-one chat), and newsgroups (which are organized
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law-makers recognize the legal issues involving computer-generated
pornographic images of children who appear to be engaged in sexual activities,
or "virtual child pornography. "' Virtual child pornography can be created by
putting an innocent picture of a real child through a scanner, and converting it
A
into an image which can then be manipulated into pornography. 3'
pornographer can create virtual child pornography by using various computer
graphics programs to create the picture of an imaginary child.32 For example,

by subject matter and allow postings of messages and files which can be read by other interested
users). While the use of the Internet by pedophiles is a growing concern, this note will not address
the issue.
30. The term "pseudo-child pornography" refers to media, and particularly to pornographic
motion pictures, in which young-looking actors who have reached the age of majority play the parts
of young children. No laws are broken since the performers only appear to be below the legal age.
This note uses the term "virtual child pornography" to refer to pornographic images which have
been produced with the use of a computer graphics program, and in which no real child was sexually
abused or exploited in the making of the image. The term is used as an intentional parallel to virtual
reality technology. See generally infra notes 160, 161.
31. Joseph N. Campolo, Childporn.gif: Establishing Liability for On-line Service Providers, 6
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 721, 735-36 (1996).
32. Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) stated:
Today, visual depictions of children engaging in any imaginable form of sexual conduct
can be produced entirely by computers without even using the actual children. [Tihe
computer equipment and expertise required to produce such high-tech kiddie porn is
readily available to any individual. All a pornographer . . . needs is a personal
computer with a few inexpensive and easy-to-use accessories, such as a scanner...
image editing and morphing software costing as little as $50 to $100, all available at
virtually any computer store or through mail-order computer catalogs.
Hearingon S. 1237 Child PornographyPrevention Act of 1995 Before the Senate JudiciaryComm.,
104th Cong. 870 (1996) (statement of Orrin Hatch, U.S. Senator) [hereinafter Hearing]. See also
Campolo, supra note 31, at 735-36. The ability of pornographers to splice a legal photograph of
a child with a legal photograph of adult pornography (to make it appear as though the child is
engaged in sexual conduct) could be a way to circumvent child pornography laws. Id. at 736 (citing
Joshua Quittner, Computers Customize Child Porn, NEWSDAY, Mar. 6, 1993, at 74). Soon, the new
technology will become wide-spread: "Eventually, inexpensive software and hardware will be
available which will allow one to create photo-realistic animated images in the privacy of one's own
home." David B. Johnson, Why the Possession of Computer-GeneratedChild PornographyCan Be
ConstitutionallyProhibited, 4 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 311, 316 (1994). In addition, the possibility
exists for creation of virtual child pornography by assembling several pictures of different children,
or by simulating sexual situations involving youthful-looking adults. Lance Gay, Target: Kid Porn
in Cyberspace, THE PLAIN DEALER, June 5, 1996, at 16A. In addition, it is possible to create
virtual child pornography that professionals and physicians would have a difficult time determining
whether it is real child pornography. See Hearing, supra, at 878 (quoting Chief U.S. Postal
Inspector Jeffrey J.Duplika). Computer-generated images can become so sophisticated that it will
be very difficult to tell if a computer file is a "real" image, made by merely scanning an existing
photograph, or if it is an illusion, created or altered with graphics software. An interesting example
of this technology
can be found on the World Wide Web at
http://www.futurenow.com/campaign/poster.htm (visited Nov. 12, 1995). This site features a
picture of a naked, imaginary person called Ima Dreamer who is half male, half female. Id. Even
when examining the picture itself, one has difficulty telling where reality ends, and where the
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a pedophile would obtain an innocent picture of a real child, such as those found
in department store catalogs. 33 He would then use a scanner to turn this
picture into a computer file.' At that point, he can bring the image up on his
computer screen using a graphics viewer, 35 and he can edit the picture however
he chooses using graphics software.3 6 He could insert the child's face into
pornographic pictures of adults, that he has obtained from legal magazines and
scanned into his system. With a little editing, he can make it appear as though
the child is engaging in any sort of sexual activity.
morphing begins. Id. Only by using logic does the viewer realize that the image is a fiction: the
face is clearly that of a man, but most of the body appears female. Id. A recent Ameritech
television commercial also illustrates the availability and capabilities of this technology. In this
commercial, a young woman sends a computerized image of herself to a young man, and the man
uses a graphics program to splice her face onto the body of an angel. Television Commercial:
Ameritech (aired, Mar. 9, 1997) [hereinafter Ameritech].
33. Images of children can be found in any magazine or catalog which advertises children's
clothing, toys, or other items marketed toward children or parents. For example, a Sears or J.C.
Penney catalog would contain pictures of child models.
34. A scanner is a computer device which converts hard copies of pictures into binary computer
files, which can then be stored on the computer hard drive just as any other file.
35. A graphics viewer is a computer program which allows a user to view a graphics file on
the computer screen.
36. Several types of computer graphics software programs are available in various price ranges.
One program, called "Morph," costs only $12.99, and it allows the user to manipulate computer
images in a variety of ways. Computer Software Product: MORPH STUDIO (Ulead Systems, Inc.
1994-5). The sleeve of this CD-ROM program contains an example of what can be done with the
software: a young boy's image is transformed into that of an adult man. Id. The software promises:
"Now you can change the world-in minutes. Turn boys into men, shoes into ships, muscles into
mountains . . . and frogs into princes. With stunning visual effects, Morph Studio makes you the
wizard of image transformation." Id. The software is not specifically marketed as a tool by which
one can create child pornography and may presumably be used for various noble purposes. See infra
note 225. See also Russel A. Rohde, Manifesto for Digital Imaging and Manipulation, 61 PSA
JOURNAL 26 (1995).
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This virtual child pornography37 could then be sent through the Internet"
to various newsgroups39 or similar forums for pedophiles around the world to
view. Alternatively, the pornography may never leave the creator's own
computer screen. A pornographer or pedophile could also store virtual
pornography images in the privacy of his or her own computer hard drive.' °
Unlike paper magazines and hard copies of pornography, computer images
would take up very little physical space, making it easy for pornographers to
conceal them.4
However, with this new technology, it would be virtually impossible for a
law enforcement officer to tell, just by looking at the image, whether a real
child was sexually abused in its production.42 Computer graphics technology
has become so advanced that it would be very difficult for even a graphics
expert to determine if an image has been altered.43 And unless a lay person
actually watched an image as it was created or computer-manipulated, he or she
would not be able to distinguish an altered image from an unaltered one."
New technologies inspire new debates, often around constitutional issues.
For example, sophisticated automatic weapons are the subject of Second
Amendment debates,45 and the use of thermal surveillance equipment has led
37. See supra note 30. The emergence of virtual reality technology raises many of the same
issues that virtual child pornography does, especially issues related to the right to privacy. See infra
note 160. As Lou Ming noted,
With virtual reality, a user could simulate acts that, if actually carried out, would be
crimes. The crimes, though, would only take place inside the computer, and the
imagination of the user. The drug-like quality of virtual reality prompted Jerry Garcia,
the leader of the Grateful Dead band, to retort: 'They made LSD illegal. I wonder what
they are going to do about this stuff.'
Lou Ming, Computer Explores Realm of Senses in Age of Hyperreality, July 23, 1992, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters File. The future of virtual reality users in general will undoubtedly
be affected by how much, if at all, virtual child pornography will be regulated. For more discussion
of virtual reality and related issues, see generally infra part III and especially infra note 160.
38. The images could be sent via e-mail to particular people around the world, or they could
be generally uploaded to a BBS. See supra note 29.
39. For a brief definition of a newsgroup, see supra note 29.
40. A hard drive, or hard disk, is a storage area for data on a computer.
41. See infra note 128 and accompanying text.
42. Campolo, supra note 31, at 735-36. Consumers can achieve photo-realistic quality by
scanning their own photographs into digital form as a computer file. They can then manipulate the
pictures with software costing less than $500, and this would allow them to transpose features from
one image and to another. This will result in an image that the lay-person is unable to distinguish
from an authentic, scanned photograph. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. E.g., Symposium, Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994: The Great
Assault Weapon Hoax, 20 U. DAYTON L. REV. 619 (1995).
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to legal discussions regarding the Fourth Amendment. 46 Computer graphics
technology is no exception. Emerging technology allows users to manipulate the

images of children, and this necessarily requires a discussion of child
pornography and the First Amendment. But before the issues surrounding
virtual child pornography can be analyzed, a proper legal background must be
established.
B. The FirstAmendment, Strict Scrutiny, and Child Pornography
The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." 4 7 However, the U.S.
Supreme Court has recognized that, in certain circumstances, some forms of
speech create a danger of bringing about substantive evils that Congress has the
right to prevent. 48 The test for whether a government can regulate a particular
form or context of speech is normally one of strict scrutiny, 49 but when certain
categories of speech are at issue, the test may be slightly different.5 0 For
example, with regard to obscenity, 5 the government must merely convince a

46. E.g., Scott J. Smith, Note, Thermal Surveillanceand the ExtraordinaryDevice Exception:
Re-Defining the Scope of the Katz Analysis, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 1071 (1996).
47. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
48. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (holding that Congress may suppress
speech if the speech presents a clear and present danger that it will bring about substantive evils that
Congress has a right to prevent). The Court, per Justice Holmes, noted that although the First
Amendment protects the freedom of speech, it does not protect one from criminal or civil liability
for falsely crying "fire" in a crowded theater. Id. The Schenck opinion reflects the notion that the
courts must balance the government's interest against the freedom of speech in determining whether
a regulation limiting a particular kind of speech is constitutional. Id. at 52.
49. In order for a government regulation to pass the strict scrutiny test, it must meet the
following criteria: the regulation must be narrowly drafted; the government must have an overriding
interest in preventing harm; the regulation must directly advance the government's interest; and the
regulation must be no more drastic than necessary to serve the government interest. See Turner
Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 819 F. Supp. 32 (D.D.C. 1993). For a discussion of this standard,
see infra notes 186-91 and accompanying text.
50. The Supreme Court has recognized that certain types of speech have such low social value
that they can be regulated without the government meeting the strict scrutiny test. See, e.g.,
Schenck, 249 U.S. at 47 (holding that the advocacy of illegal action can be proscribed if the
government meets a test of proximity and degree of harm); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)
(holding that obscene materials can be regulated and do not receive the highest level of First
Amendment protection); Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (holding that "fighting
words"-words which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of
the peace-can be proscribed by the government, as they have very little social value, and are not
the essential part of any ideas).
51. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24-25. Miller held that the trier of fact must determine whether a work
is obscene, based on the following factors:
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary community standards" would
find the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest . . . ; (b) whether the
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically
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trier of fact that the work is legally obscene.52 If the government can meet this
burden, the work is presumed to be without First Amendment protection, and
it can, therefore, be regulated constitutionally.53
In 1982, the U.S. Supreme Court in New York v. Ferber created a new
category of unprotected speech: child pornography.' In Ferber, the Court held
that the evils involved in producing child pornography, namely the sexual abuse
of children, caused the material to fall outside of the protection of the First
Amendment. 55 The government, therefore, met its strict scrutiny burden of
proof.56 New York's interest in preventing child sexual abuse at the hands of
child pornographers was compelling enough to allow the banning of child
pornography."
The Ferber decision empowered states to enact laws to combat the child
pornography industry." The enforcement of these laws is not hindered by the
constitutional attacks based on the First Amendment issues involved in laws
regulating obscenity,59 because child pornography may be made illegal per se,

defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks
serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value.
Id. at 24. For a more detailed analysis of Miller, see also infra notes 67-74 and accompanying text.
52. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24-25.
53. Id.
54. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
55. Id. at 764.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. As a result of Ferber, numerous states have enacted criminal statutes prohibiting the
production, promotion, sale, exhibition, or distribution of photographs of children engaged in sexual
activity. REPORT, supra note 9, at 415. See generally ALA. CODE § 13A-12-197 (1996); ALASKA
STAT. § 11.41.455, § 11.61.125 (Michie 1995); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-27-304 (Michie 1995); CAL.
PENAL CODE §311.3, § 311.11 (West 1996); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-193 (1994); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 11, § 1111 (1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-100 (1996); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-20.1
(West 1996); IND. CODE § 35-42-4-4 (1996); MD. CODE ANN. § 419A (1996); MASS. ANN. LAWS
ch. 272, § 29A (Law. Co-op. 1996); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-5-33 (1996); MO. REV. STAT. §
573.010 (1995); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-625 (1995); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1463.03 (1996);
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.730 (Michie 1995); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 649-A:2 (1995); N.J.
REV. STAT. § 2A:30B-3 (1995); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263.05 (1996); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2907.322 (Anderson 1996); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.684 (1995); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6312 (1996);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-335 (Law. Co-op. 1995); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-22-23.1
(Michie 1996); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-902 (1996); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 43.26 (West
1996); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5a-1 (1996); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-374.1 (Michie 1996); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 9.68A.070 (West 1995); WiS. STAT. § 948.12 (1994).
59. See supra note 7.
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without any proof that the material is obscene.' Child pornography has been
defined as photographs of actual children engaged in some sort of sexual
activity, either with adults or with other children. 6 Child pornography, of
course, includes still photographs, but it may also take the form of videos, or
still photographs that have been scanned into a computer image.' However,
child pornography does not include hand-made drawings, sculptures, or graphic
written accounts of sex with children.' In order to understand a legal analysis

60. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
Stanley upheld an individual's right to privately possess obscene materials in his own home, but this
holding does not create a right to deal in pornographic materials. It also does not apply to child
pornography. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 568 n. 11 (stating that "[w]hat we have said in no way infringes
upon the power of the State or Federal Government to make possession of other items . . . a
crime"). In another case, the Court held that, because Ohio's interest was the protection of the
victims of child pornography, and that interest was greater than Georgia's paternalistic interest in
Stanley, the mere possession of child pornography can be criminalized. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S.
103 (1990). Traditionally, government has had to justify its regulation of sexually explicit material
by showing that the material is obscene under the Miller test. See notes 67-74 and accompanying
text. The Ferber Court held that the obscenity standard was inadequate to protect the government's
interest in protecting children from sexual exploitation by pornographers. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764.
The Court therefore held that child pornography is a new category of speech, unprotected by the
First Amendment, which may be regulated without consideration of any obscenity standards. Id.
61. REPORT, supra note 9, at 405. See also KATHLEEN C. FALLER, UNDERSTANDING CHILD
SEXUAL MALTREATMENT 45 (1990) ("Child pornography may consist of children having sex with
adults, with other children, or engaging in seductive or masturbatory activities solo. Photographs
,*. are then made of children engaging in these acts. This material is produced for the gratification
of adults, although those producing child pornography are not necessarily sexually attracted to
children.") Most of the child pornography produced in the United States comes from practicing
pedophiles who trade the pictures with other pedophiles. JOHN CREWDSON, BY SILENCE BETRAYED:
SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN IN AMERICA 100-01 (1988). Pedophiles use homemade pornography
to feed their fantasies, and the photographs serve as a permanent record of the children that the
pedophile has known. Id. Some pedophiles collect child pornography merely to aid in fantasizing.
REPORT, supra note 9, at 649. However, many have used it as a tool in the production of their own
child pornography. Id. See also infra notes 147-51 and accompanying text.
62. Merely scanning a picture so as to make it a binary file and storing it on one's computer
does not make it legal, although it does make it more difficult for law enforcement officers to
discover that a person possesses child pornography. See supra text accompanying note 40.
63. The Supreme Court held that the nature of the harm to be combated requires that
regulations be limited to works that visually depict sexual conduct by children below a specified age.
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982). The Court further noted that descriptions or
depictions of sexual conduct, not otherwise obscene, which do not involve live performance or
photographic or other visual reproduction of live performances, retain First Amendment protection.
Id. Thus, the Court's new category of unprotected speech is quite narrow. See REPORT, supranote
9, at 596-97.
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it is important to

note that, until very recently, child pornography, by definition, required
pedophiles' to sexually exploit children in order to create the materials.'
The U.S. Supreme Court's creation of a new category of unprotected
speech grew out of its prior rulings on obscenity. 7 In Miller v. Californias
the Court held that obscenity does not fall under the protection of the First
Amendment.' The Court provided a test for determining when a work may
be deemed obscene and, therefore, not entitled to First Amendment
protection.7' In order for a work to be considered legally obscene, an average
person, applying contemporary community standards, would have to find that
the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient 7 interest.'
Second, the
work must depict or describe, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the appropriate state law.7 3 Third, the work must, when
taken as a whole, lack serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value. 74
Miller addressed the issue of adult pornography, not child pornography.75
Although the Miller Court held that the distribution of obscene materials can be
regulated, in a prior case, Stanley v. Georgia, the Court held that the private
possession of obscenity cannot be proscribed.76 This ruling was based on a
person's right to privacy in his or her own home, and the issue of the First

64. See infra part IV.
65. Pedophilia is the act or fantasy of engaging in sexual activity with prepubescent children
as a repeatedly preferred or exclusive method of achieving sexual excitement. Symposium, Panel
II: Censorship on the Internet: Do Obscene or Pornographic Materials Have a Protected Status?,
5 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 279 (1995) [hereinafter Symposium]. See also
RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 996 (1992) (defining pedophilia as "sexual
desire in an adult for a child").
66. See supra note 9.
67. See generally Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (holding that the First
Amendment does not protect obscene material); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (upholding
an individual's right to privately possess obscene materials in one's home); Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15, 23-24 (1973) (providing a test for a fact-finder to use to determine if a work is legally
obscene).
68. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
69. However, the Court in Miller also held that regulations on obscenity are still regulations,
and must therefore be limited. Miller, 413 U.S. at 23-24. See also Roth, 354 U.S. at 484-86.
70. Miller, 413 U.S. at 21.
71. Id. "Prurient" is defined as "having, or inclined to have, or characterized by lascivious
or lustful thoughts, desires, etc ...
" RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1088
(1992).
72. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1973).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 18.
76. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969).
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The Court, in Stanley, held that, not
Amendment was not paramount.'
withstanding the government's right to regulate the distribution of obscene
materials, it does not have the right to control the moral content of a person's
thoughts.7" The Court reasoned that the government may not prohibit the mere
possession of obscene material on the grounds that it may lead to antisocial
conduct.

79

The Court took a considerably stronger stance on child pornography. In
making its ruling, the Court in Ferberfound the Miller obscenity standard' to
be insufficient in addressing the problem of sexual exploitation of children. 8
The Court therefore held that the state's ban on child pornography was
In a
constitutional, regardless of whether the material was "obscene."'
subsequent decision, Osborne v. Ohio, the Court held that the mere possession
of child pornography could be criminalized"3 because the state has a compelling
interest in protecting children from being exploited through pornography.'
To date, the Supreme Court has decided no case that explicitly addresses
the issue of virtual child pornography.'
Ferber was the first, and is the
leading, case on child pornography, and it should therefore guide the Supreme
Court when it eventually addresses the issue of virtual child pornography. In
addition, over the past several years, many cases have arisen which have
addressed other issues involved in child pornography.'M

77. Id. (the Court also relied upon the Fourteenth Amendment in making its ruling).
78. Id. See also infra note 293.
79. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 565-66.
80. Miller, 413 U.S. at 20.
81. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982).
82. Id.
83. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990). But see Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568
(1969) (holding that one has the right to possess obscene material in one's own home). Id.
84. Osborne, 495 U.S. at 110. Thus, the state was able to meet the strict scrutiny test, and the
regulation withstood constitutional attack. Id. The government's interest in protecting children was
found to override the pornographer's interest in producing the offending material, namely child
pornography. Id.
85. But see infra note 359.
86. See, e.g., Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990) (holding that the private possession of
child pornography may be criminalized); United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 115 S.Ct. 464
(1994) (holding that the mens rea requirement for the distribution of child pornography is
knowledge, on the part of the defendant, as to the minority of the subject of the pornography);
United States v. Nolan, 818 F.2d 1015, 1017-18 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding that it is within the range
of ordinary competence for laypersons to determine if a photograph which appears to be child
pornography is in fact a real photograph, or an artistic rendition).
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One interesting case is United States v. X-Citement Video, s' in which the
Supreme Court held that the federal child pornography statute"8 required the
government to prove that an offender had knowledge not only of the sexually
explicit nature of the materials, but also of the age of the performers. 9 This
controversial case established the level of scienter under the federal child
pornography statute to be that of knowledge.' 0 Although this more recent case
did not specifically address virtual child pornography, the Court's ruling is a
guideline just the same. This results because a legal analysis of virtual child
pornography involves the issue of whether child pornography need consist only
of sexually explicit images of actual children who are below a certain age. 91
The Court's ruling in X-Citement Video is that, not only must the subject of
pornography be actually below a certain age, but that the defendant must have
knowledge of the subject's minority and of the sexually explicit contents.'
However, this case only addresses the mens rea requirement of a defendantdistributor and does not clearly resolve the issue of culpability on the part of the
creator of the pornography.'
Congress has also addressed the issue of virtual child pornography in a
recent amendment to the federal child pornography statute." The amendment
attempts to resolve the issue of whether, under the law, virtual child
pornography should be treated the same as traditional child pornography. As
this federal amendment will be the focus of heavy analysis later in this Note, an
understanding of the amendment itself, and the rationale for its enactment, is
needed.
C. The State of the Law Today
Some states have not addressed the legal issue of virtual child pornography
at all.'
However, Congress, in The Child Pornography Prevention Act of

87. 115 S. Ct. 464 (1994).
88. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252 (West 1984).
89. X-Citement Video, 115 S. Ct. at 472.
90. Id.
91. Virtual child pornography, on the other hand, contains images of either imaginary
"children" or computer-manipulated images of real children. See infra notes 240-41 and
accompanying text.
92. X-Citement Video, 115 S. Ct. at 472.
93. See generally United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 464 (1994). Mens rea
is an element of criminal responsibility-a guilty mind. BLACK's LAW DICrIONARY 680 (1991).
94. See infra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
95. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-20.1 (West 1996) (requiring the prosecutor to prove
that the defendant knew that any child was sexually exploited in the production of the pornographic
material). For examples of similar state statutes relating to child pornography, see supra note 58.
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1996, 96 amended federal child pornography legislation,' proposing to deal
with this new technology by defining child pornography to include any material
that appears to depict children engaged in sexual activity. 98 This legislation
assumes that no actual difference exists between virtual child pornography and
traditional child pornography. 99 This assumption has drawn attacks from critics
who argue that the federal amendment expands the narrow category of child
pornography created in Ferberto include those images which do not require the
sexual abuse of children in their production.ro

96. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252 (1996). The amendment to the federal child pornography statute was
put into effect along with the Omnibus Consolidation Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, §
121, 110 Stat. 113 (1996).
97. Id. The Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 began in the Senate as S. 1237, 104th
Congress (1995). This bill went into effect in October, 1996, and it amended 18 U.S.C. § 2252.
98. See supra note 96. The amendment adds the following new subparagraphs to 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 2256 (1996):
(8) 'child pornography' means any visual depiction.., including any ... computer or
computer-generated image or picture, whether made or produced by electronic,
mechanical, or other means, of sexually explicit conduct, where(A) the production of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor
engaging in sexually explicit conduct;
(B) such visual depiction is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging in
sexually explicit conduct;
(C) such visual depiction has been created, adapted, or modified to appear
that an identifiable minor is engaging in sexually explicit conduct; or
(D) such visual depiction is advertised ... in such a manner that conveys
the impression that the material is . . . a visual depiction of a minor
engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and
(9) 'identifiable minor'(A) means a person(i)(I) who was a minor at the time the visual depiction was
created, adapted, or modified; or
(II) whose image as a minor was used in creating, adapting, or
modifying the visual depiction; and
(ii) who is recognizable as an actual person by the person's
face, likeness . . .unique birthmark or other recognizable
feature; and
(B) shall not be construed to require proof of the actual identity of the
identifiable minor."
99. See infra text accompanying note 114. See also Hearing, supra note 32, at 871.
100. The question whether the federal statutory amendment unconstitutionally expands the
definition of child pornography beyond Ferber is the focus of this note. See infra part IV and
accompanying footnotes. Many legal scholars say that the Act is plainly unconstitutional. Child
PornographyCrackdown on the Internet (National Public Radio broadcast, Nov. 11, 1996). In a
recent radio broadcast on All Things Considered, a National Public Radio program, Eric Friedman,
guest commentator, and computer law expert at Hofstra University Law School, claimed that the law
is unconstitutional because it prohibits the showing of any actor who appears to be under eighteen
years old in a sexual act, even if the actor is an adult. Id. Friedman argued that this is a sweeping
new definition of child pornography. Id. "That would probably cover angels cuddling in the
corners of Rubin's paintings . . . 'Romeo and Juliet' or 'Lolita' . . . perfectly mainstream

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1997

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 32, No. 1 [1997], Art. 7

222

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32

The Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 rests on several
Included in these findings are several alleged
congressional findings.' 0'
indirect effects of virtual child pornography,"°e as well as the direct effects of
03
These
traditional child pornography, most notably child sexual abuse.
congressional findings are the result of a hearing before the Senate Judiciary
Committee prior to the passing of the federal amendment. " Several social
workers, law enforcement officers, and other professionals testified at this
hearing as to whether the federal amendment was necessary, appropriate, and
constitutional. "0
Laws purporting to address the dangers of child pornography tend to meet
with more popular acceptance than other laws which might inspire constitutional
Nevertheless, many critics have attacked the Child Pornography
debates."
Prevention Act as being too broad." ° The American Civil Liberties Union
argues that the amendment is unconstitutional.'s Other analysts are concerned
that the amendment might lead to the suppression of legitimate multimedia or
computer graphics art. 9 Legal critics, many of whom debated the question
of virtual child pornography before the amendment was passed, seem torn on the
issue. " ° In order to understand the problem with the federal amendment as
it relates to virtual child pornography,"' a closer look at the legislation is
required.

productions in which there appear to be minors engaged in sexually explicit activity." Id. See infra
notes 225, 240-41 and accompanying text. Under Friedman's analysis, the Ameritech commercial
could be the subject of a prosecution, since an adult female's face is spliced with the naked body of
a childlike angel. Ameritech, supra note 32.
101. S. 1237, 104th Cong. § 1 (1996) (enacted).
102. Id. § 2 ((3) (finding that child pornography is used to seduce children into sexual activity);
(4) (finding that child pornography is used by pedophiles and child sexual abusers as a model to act
out sexual experiences with children, and that it therefore desensitizes the viewer to child sexual
abuse); (7) (finding that creating virtual child pornography using a real child's image invades the
child's privacy and reputational interests); (8) and (9) (finding that virtual child pornography is just
as dangerous as real child pornography in that it can be used to seduce children just as easily); and
(11) (finding that child pornography encourages a social perception of children as sexual objects and
leads to sexual abuse and exploitation of children)).
103. Id.
104. See supra note 32.
105. See supra note 32.
106. See infra note 131.
107. See supra note 100; see also infra note 225.
108. John Schwartz, New Law on 'Virtual' Child Porn Is Criticized, SEATrLE TIMES, Oct. 6,
1996, at A24 (quoting Daniel Katz, legislative counsel of the American Civil Liberties Union).
109. See infra note 225.
110. See infra note 225.
111. See infra part IV and accompanying footnotes.
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The federal law bars individuals from using images of real children who are
made to look as though they were engaging in sexually explicit conduct, even
if they were not so engaged."'
An example of this is seen in the above
hypothetical, in which Johnson splices a child's head with an adult's body. In
addition, the law prohibits material which appears to depict actual children
engaged in sex, which was not created using either a real child, or an image of
a real child."'
An example of this would be if Johnson created a
pornographic image using a child who he had completely made up using his
imagination. As Senator Hatch, one supporter of the bill which amended the
federal child pornography legislation, states: "if you can't tell the difference
[between real and virtual child pornography] then there isn't any difference.
And this bill says if it's so real or apparent, then it will be treated as if it's
4
real." "
Federal child pornography legislation needs to be amended to effectively
counteract child pornographers who may try to use new computer technologies
as a loophole by which to escape criminal liability. Under the federal child
pornography statute before it was recently amended, "' and under many state
statutes, " ' the prosecutor would carry the burden of proving that the
pornography in question actually depicts real minors engaging in sexual
activities." 7 Although the current solution to this dilemma may not pass a
constitutional attack based on the First Amendment, as argued later in this
Note," 8 it is possible to amend the prior federal child pornography legislation
so as to punish culpable child pornographers within the bounds of the
Constitution." 9 In order to see why an alternative amendment to the federal
legislation is required, it is necessary to examine the potential impact that
computer graphics technology may have on the child pornography industry.
III.

THE PICTURES, THE MARKET, THE LAW: How COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY
MAY CHANGE THE CHILD PORNOGRAPHY INDUSTRY,
AND How THE LAW CAN ADAPT TO THIS NEW TECHNOLOGY

In addition to the technological and legal backgrounds into which virtual
child pornography will be introduced, an exploration of the social background

112. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
113. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
114. Hearing, supra note 32, at 894 (statement of Bruce Taylor, President and Chief of the
Nat'l Law Center).
115. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252 (1982).
116. See supra notes 13, 58.
117. See supra notes 13, 115.
118. See infra part IV.
119. This note proposes a constitutionally permissible alternative amendment to the federal child
pornography legislation. See infra part V.
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of this industry is also needed. The effects that virtual child pornography may
have on the child pornography industry must be understood in light of relevant
social paradigms. An understanding of how pedophiles might use virtual child
pornography for seductive purposes is needed as well. The potential effects that
computer graphics technology may have on society must also be considered
before a full legal analysis can be understood.
A. The Effects of Computer Graphics Technology on the PornographyMarket
Whether the new computer graphics technology is to be used for good or
evil remains to be seen, and will no doubt rest in the hands of the owners of the
computer scanners and software.
Like most technology, the ability to
manipulate photographs can be used in various ways, for various purposes, some
not as noble as the rest. 20 Computer-generated imaging allows for law
enforcement officers to project the age-enhanced images of missing children.'
It allows witnesses to give more detailed descriptions of criminal suspects to
investigators.' 22 It has many benefits to entertainers as well as middle class
individuals who self-indulge in posing for pictures that will be retouched and
enhanced. 23 Unfortunately, like every invention from the printing press to the
Internet, computer graphics technology provides the less-than-scrupulous few the
opportunity to offend, libel, humiliate and obstruct others. But however it is to
be used, this new technology may have some impact on the child pornography
industry. These potential results need to be examined in order to properly
understand a legal analysis of virtual child pornography.
As computer graphics technology becomes more accessible and
sophisticated, virtual child pornography may soon take the place of those
materials which require the sexual abuse of real children for their
production.' 24 And, if pornographers learn that virtual child pornography

120. See infra notes 157-60 and accompanying text.
121. Helping Locate Children, Executive Memo, GOV'T EXECUTIVE, Sept. 1992; Robert
Janiszewski, Digitized Photos Help Track Kidnapped Children, 110 AMERICAN CITY & COUNTY,
Dec. 1995, at 40.
122. Joseph J. Atick, Face Recognition from Live Video for Real-World Applications, 10
ADVANCED IMAGING 58 (1995) (promoting a software product called "Facelt," which could be used
by police artists to help identify criminals).
123. Jill Charles, Your Pictureand Your Resume: More Bangfor Your Bucks!, 37 BACK STAGE
22 (1996) (discussing photographers that provide retouching services for up-and-coming actors).
124. Hearing, supra note 32, at 890 (testimony of Kevin V. Digregory) ("Soon it will not be
necessary to actually molest children to produce child pornography .... All that will be necessary
will be an inexpensive computer, readily available software, and a photograph of a neighbor's child
shot while the child walked to school or waited for a bus."). Id. While it would disturb many
parents to have photographs of their children used to fuel a pedophile's fantasy, an
alternative-actual molestation-is a greater evil. See infra notes 250-52.
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cannot be proscribed due to the First Amendment,'2 they will have an
incentive to refrain from abusing real children to continue their business.126
Less serious pornographers and pedophiles'" may find virtual child
pornography to be safer to produce than that material which uses real children,
because the former can be produced in the privacy of their own homes, with
very little risk of detection.'28 As a result, society might even benefit if a
curious dabbler in pedophilia is allowed to vent his or her desire on a computer
screen instead of ruining a child's life for a sexual experience. 2 9 If virtual
child pornography is found to remain within the protection of the First
Amendment, a pedophile could not be convicted for merely possessing it in his
own home, even if the material could be considered to be obscene. "o

125. If virtual child pornography is not child pornography (as this note maintains), the material
could not be proscribed unless it is found to be obscene under the Miller standard. Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). See supra notes 67-74 and accompanying text. But, even if the
material is obscene, the private possession of it in one's home cannot be proscribed under Stanley.
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). Obscenity is unlike real child pornography, which can
be illegal per se. See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990); see supra note 60.
126. This rationale, of course, would only apply to pornographers like Smith and Johnson, who
have no sexual compulsion towards children. See supra part I. Habitual child molesters would
probably not find computer-generated images to be a viable alternative. See infra notes 141-42 and
accompanying text. These offenders are the most serious threat to children, because their desires
go beyond the desires of Jones, who merely likes viewing pornography. See supra part I.
127. The "less serious pornographers and pedophiles" would include those persons who may
have a passing sexual interest in children, but no real desire to sexually interact with children. Id.
Some of these persons could be juveniles or young adults who will never present a real threat to
children, but who may want to engage in producing virtual pornography of their peers or of
imaginary persons as a way of dealing with sexual confusion, or of shocking and impressing their
friends, or of gaining popularity. For an explanation of some of the uses for child pornography, see
supra note 61 and infra notes 147-51.
128. Unless the pedophile chooses to share the images with outsiders, it is unlikely that he or
she would ever be discovered. A family member or friend who had access to the computer would
be the only person who would be able to tell what the pedophile was doing. See supra notes 40,
62 and accompanying text.
129. Although there is no direct victim of virtual child pornography, those who believe that the
material should be proscribed argue that the possibility of indirect victims justifies regulations. See
infra part IV.C. The indirect victims could include a child who is seduced by a pedophile who uses
a computer-generated child pornography image, ora sexually abused child whose rights are forgotten
when computer graphics technology prevents child pornography laws from being enforceable.
Johnson, supra note 32, at 330.
130. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 564. For an analysis of Miller, see supra notes 67-74 and
accompanying text. Local and state obscenity statutes would probably be able to prohibit the
distribution of virtual child pornography, assuming that the state could prove that the material meets
the test for obscenity; that is, the work must lack serious artistic, scientific, political, social or
literary value, and it must appeal to those prurient interests so as to be offensive to the community.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1997

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 32, No. 1 [1997], Art. 7

226

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32

The crime of possession of child pornography carries with it a social
stigma that could very well shatter one's reputation in the community.'
In
order to avoid conviction, pedophiles, like Jones in the above hypothetical,132
would ensure that their collections included only those images that they could
prove were not created using real children. Such persons would still probably
be prosecuted, because a law enforcement officer would likely have difficulty
telling if the image was real or fake. However, under a proposed amendment
to the federal statute,'33 they would be able to exonerate themselves if they
could prove that the images were virtual pornography."
This Note will argue that Congress should amend federal child pornography
legislation to properly address the issue of virtual child pornography. " Under
the amendment to the federal child pornography statute that is proposed in this
Note," habitual child molesters and serious pornographers like Smith and
Jones will not be able to exonerate themselves by relying on the defense that the
images which they possessed were merely virtual child pornography. 37 This
will be due to the difficulty of proving that each image in their huge collection
is virtual child pornography, 3 ' and that no one sexually abused an actual child
in the production of the materials. Since many child pornographers and
pedophiles are well-respected members of the community who have much to lose
in a criminal prosecution,' 39 they will likely choose to make and possess only

131. Unlike some other classes of offenders, child molesters and child pornographers are
subject to the scorn of even the most violent criminals. See Symposium, supra note 65, at 299 ("No
one likes a child pornographer; no one likes a pedophile. So proposals to regulate conduct to attack
this problem does [sic] not inspire traditional First Amendment debate.").
132. See supra part I.
133. For the proposed alternative amendment to 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252, see infra part V.
134. See infra part V.
135. See infra part V.
136. See infra part V.
137. See supra part I.
138. Pedophiles commonly desire to have large collections of photographs of children.
REPORT, supra note 9, at 407.
139. One government official has testified that:
[Pedophiles) come from all walks of life. The occupations of some of the offenders
arrested in the United States include: doctors, teachers, lawyers, law enforcement
officers, clergymen, and businessmen ....
Many hold respected positions in their
community and have concealed their interest in child pornography for years. The
hobbies of offenders include coaching youth sports, dance instruction, leading youth
groups, baby-sitting, and amateur photography.
Hearing, supra note 32, at 878 (testimony of Postal Chief Jeffrey J. Dupilka). Pedophiles come
from all socioeconomic backgrounds and can include teenagers as well. Symposium, supra note 65,
at 303. "The pedophile has an excessive interest in children. He has easy access to children and
usually comes across as the 'nice guy'." Id. A small proportion of child sexual abusers are totally
unknown to the victim prior to the abuse. KATHLEEN C. FALLER, UNDERSTANDING CHILD SEXUAL
MALTREATMENT 49-50 (1990). Offenders can be intrafamilial or extrafamilial. Id.
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those images which they are reasonably sure are virtual child pornography. '4
Many habitual child molesters will still insist on abusing children,'4 but the
economic and legal incentive should encourage the business-oriented
pornographers who are just in it for the money, '4 2 like Smith in the above
hypothetical,' 43 to switch to legal pornography.'"
The argument can be
made that the more that pornographers choose to use virtual child pornography
instead of real child pornography, the more that children will be saved from
sexual exploitation.45

Extrafamilial offenders include neighbors, friends of the family, and people who work with children,
such as day-care providers, teachers, counselors, mental health practitioners, pediatricians or scout
leaders. Id.
140. This of course assumes logic on the part of collectors of child pornography. See infra
notes 141-42.
141. Naturally, the problem of child pornography does not only involve those pedophiles like
Smith and Jones. See hypotheticals supra part I. Undoubtedly, there are people who both collect
and view child pornography, and sexually molest children because of a sexual attraction to children,
and not to merely to produce more pornography. See supra note 61. Economic and legal good
sense may not be a legitimate concern with this sort of offender. It is precisely this sort of predator
that our criminal justice system is designed to combat, but going after these people will undoubtedly
be a task independent from the apprehension of those who merely create, possess and sell pictures.
One author has argued that:
No one is suggesting that the effort to stamp out the actual production of child
pornography be abandoned . . . since in order to produce such pornography it is
necessary to sexually abuse a child. But the possibility must be considered that a more
intensive effort to wipe out the clandestine exchange of existing child pornography
amounts to treating the symptom and not the disease.
CREWDSON, supra note 61, at 247.
142. Some child pornographers may possess sexual records of children for their own fantasies.
See supra note 61 and infra notes 147-51. However, others seem to be involved in the industry for
the money. An "international child pornography ring," which investigators tracked through its post
office boxes in Sweden and Denmark, was traced to a California woman who was netting $500,000
a year selling mail-order pornography. CREWDSON, supra note 61, at 243.
143. See infra part 1.
144. Although Smith would still have to conform to obscenity statutes if the material is
considered obscene under the Miller analysis (see supra notes 67-74 and accompanying text), antiobscenity laws are typically more lenient than those that deal with child pornography. See supra
note 60. Also, although the private possession of child pornography can be criminalized under
Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990), the right to view obscene materials in one's own home has
been upheld in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
145. If child pornographers can create what appears to viewers to be the same product on
computer screens, as they would by sexually abusing real children, then real child may never be
abused at all. See Adelman, supra note 19, at 491; Anne Wells Branscomb, Internet Babylon?, 83
GEO. L.J. 1935, 1955-56 (1995). The Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 itself rests on the
assumption that computer graphics technology makes the actual sexual abuse of a child unnecessary
for the production of virtual child pornography. See supra note 32 and infra note 203 and
accompanying text.
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B. The Use of Child Pornography to Seduce Other Children
Just as virtual child pornography has important legal differences from real
child pornography, 1" it also has many practical differences. If it is used as
a tool by which a pedophile can attempt to seduce real children for sexual abuse,
virtual child pornography may prove an even greater danger than its "real"
counterpart. It is necessary to understand how child pornography is used in
order to determine the most effective way to address the issue of virtual child

pornography.
Pedophiles use child pornography to achieve several goals. First, is the
motive of personal sexual stimulation for the pedophile. 47 Second, child
pornography is also used to reduce the inhibitions of a potential child sexual
assault victim. 148
Third, there is evidence that pedophiles use child
pornography as an instructional tool with which to teach children how to engage
in sexual activities.14 9 Fourth, pornography is produced to barter, sell or trade
with other pedophiles. 5 0 Fifth, child molesters can use child pornography to
Sixth, some pedophiles use
blackmail a victimized child into silence.'
pornography as a seduction tool, to show intended victims that it is acceptable
for children to engage in sexual intercourse with adults. 5'

146. See supra part II.A (explaining how virtual child pornography is created differently from
real child pornography) and infra part IV (analyzing the legal distinctions between virtual child
pornography and real child pornography).
147. SHIRLEY O'BRIEN, CHILD PORNOGRAPHY xi-xiii (1983).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. Bruce Taylor gave the following testimony at the Senate Hearing: "Manipulated
imagery has the same effect on pedophiles as actual child pornography, and therefore, is every bit
as dangerous to society as actual child pornography." Hearing, supra note 32, at 895 (testimony
of Bruce Taylor). This line of thinking assumes that the danger of actual child pornography is its
is irrelevant
effect on the pedophile, and not on the child subjects. Taylor maintained that "[i]t
whether [the image] is 'real' or 'apparent', whether it is an actual crime scene photo or is a realistic
fake or counterfeit recreation of one." Id. However, in Ferber, the Supreme Court did not use, as
the justification for a ban on child pornography, the possible effect of an image on a pornographer;
rather, it used the fact that child pornography is an actual crime scene photo. New York v. Ferber,
458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982).
152. REPORT, supra note 9, at 649 ("A child who is reluctant to engage in sexual activity with
an adult or to pose for sexually explicit photos can sometimes be convinced by viewing other
children having 'fun' participating in the activity. From a very early age children are taught to
respect and believe material contained in books and will thus have the same beliefs about child
pornography"). See also Johnson, supra note 32, at 327 ("In the case of computer-generated child
pornography, the image will be even more persuasive to children than an obvious drawing because
it looks lifelike. Furthermore, pedophiles may be able to fool young children into having sex with
them if they show pictures of themselves having sex with what appears to be the child's friend or
sibling.").
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With virtual child pornography, a pedophile could manipulate a picture of
a child's sibling or friend, and make it appear as though he or she had engaged
in sexual intercourse with the molester.' 53 A trusting child who is not
educated regarding the tricks available with today's technology would assume
that the picture proves that the event occurred, just as a naive child might
believe a stranger who tells him that his parents sent the molester to pick the
child up from school.' 54 Seeing a friend, or particularly an older brother or
sister, engaging in sexual conduct could send a message to the child that it is
natural or acceptable for children to have sex with adults.' 55 Thus, even more
so than traditional child pornography, virtual child pornography has the potential
to help a pedophile seduce a child. 5 6 Ignorance of the new computer graphics
technology could prove disastrous to childrtn who are targeted by pedophiles,
and this threat is one of many potential effects that virtual child pornography
may have on the child pornography industry.

C. The Need for a Healthy Skepticism of Pictures
History has shown that technology cannot be willed away to non-existence
because certain uses of it are illegal or offend others.1'7 Computer graphics
programs will only become more sophisticated and accessible until, eventually,
the psychological force of visual images are undermined. ' A photograph will
no longer be seen as a representation of absolute, truthful history. As images
are seen to be changeable at will, they will command less reliance.
Pornographic images will be no exception to this trend. 9

153. Johnson, supra note 32, at 327 (see quote cited supra note 152).
154. See supra note 152 and accompanying text. Children are taught to believe what they see
in pictures, just as they are taught to respect books. Johnson, supra note 32, at 327.
155. Id.
156. A child might be more convinced to engage in sexual activities by looking at a
pornographic image of someone that he or she knows, as opposed to looking at child pornography
of a stranger. Id.
157. Science-fiction author Ray Bradbury has observed, "Each time we dream a new dream,
blueprint a new blueprint or extrude into three-dimensional form some new electronic or mechanical
technology, we birth at the same instant the Beast of Iniquity and the Angel of Mercy." RAY
BRADBURY, YESTERMORROW 12 (1991). See also Michael Heim, The Design of Virtual Reality, in
CYBERSPACE/CYBERBODIES/CYBERPUNK 70 (1995) ("[Flrom the past uses and abuses of technology
... we can safely guess that [virtual reality technology] will bring about negative as well as positive
developments").
158. Michael Featherstone & Roger Burrows, Cultures of Technological Embodiment, in
CYBERSPACE/CYBERBODIES/CYBERPUNK 1-19, 5-6 (1995). See generally supra note 32.
159. For an example of how the reality of photographs can be deconstructed, see infra notes
171-78 and accompanying text. Catherine A. MacKinnon notes how pornographic images could be
a particular target for such deconstruction. Catherine A. MacKinnon, Vindication and Resistance:
A Response to the CarnegieMellon Study of Pornographyin Cyberspace, 83 GEO. L.J. 1959, 1961
(1995) ("Pornography in the marketplace of life . . . has fallen into a reality warp. Harmless
fantasy, it is called.").
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Virtual reality technology is contributing to the ambiguity of the reality of
visual images."W Like television in its early days, virtual reality experiences
may seem real to the participant, even though, in fact, they represent a mere
induced hallucination. 6' Soon, virtual reality will allow users to act out

various scenarios in the privacy of their own homes, using whatever images they
please. 62 This could include using the image of a real person in one's own
sexual fantasies, allowing the virtual reality participant to "use" the person's
face and body without the person being physically present.
The ethics of using technology in this way are unclear. Although the
person to whom the image belongs is not physically harmed or required to
actually participate in the experience, the person may feel offended at having his
or her image used in such a way, without consent.163 Although such virtual
reality technology is not yet easily accessible to the average person,' the
ethical considerations have been speculated upon in various forums, including
the science fiction media. These considerations include the right to have one's
privacy protected with respect to personal fantasies, as well as whether using a
person's image constitutes an invasion of that person's privacy. "

160. The term "virtual reality" (VR) has been defined as a system which provides a realistic
sense of being immersed in an environment. Featherstone & Burrows, supra note 158, at 5-6. "It
is a computer-generated, visual, audible and tactile multi-media experience." Id. See KEN
PIMENTAL & KEvIN TEIXEIRA, VIRTUAL REALITY 240 (1993) ("The ability to simulate and quickly
change the worlds we play in should make us more aware of the transient nature, the illusion of the
permanence in the real world.") Virtual reality will change the way we think about our visual
realities, as it will transform our thoughts into commodities and artifacts that can be shared, or sold
to others. Id. See also Heim, supra note 157, at 65-77, 69-70 ("VR will very likely transform the
culture that uses it"). The term "virtual reality" is an oxymoron which provides a semantic twist
which illustrates a tenuous grasp on reality, as well as the computerization of our lives. Id. at 65
("Software now belongs to the substance of life. Life's body is becoming indistinguishable from
its computer prosthesis"). Virtual computer images of even real people may undermine reality as
it has traditionally been represented by still photographs, which were considered to be visual records
of actual events. See also Vivian Sobchack, New Age MutantNinja Hackers:Reading Mondo 2000,
in FLAME WARS: THE DISCOURSE OF CYBERCULTURE 11-28, 19 (Mark Dery ed. 1994) ("[TI]he
lived meaning of space, time, and subjectivity has been radically altered by electronic technologies
in an experience that may be described, and cannot be denied").
161. In the early days of cinema, people would be amazed at the sight of a train coming at them
from the motion picture screen. The visual impact was so powerful that people ran out of the
theaters in fright. Brian R. Gardner, The Creator's Toolbox, in VIRTUAL REALITY: APPLICATIONS
& EXPLORATIONS 91-121 (Alan Wexelblat ed. 1993).
162. See supra note 160.
163. See infra note 165 for an example of how this issue has been treated in popular culture.
164. John C. Briggs, The Promise of Virtual Reality, FUTURIST, Sept.-Oct. 1996, at 13, 16.
165. An interesting example can be seen in an episode of Star Trek: The Next Generation,
entitled "Hollow Pursuits." In this episode, a timid character used a "holodeck" (a room which uses
futuristic virtual reality technology to allow the user to act out fantasies) to live out his secret
desires. Star Trek: The Next Generation(Paramount Pictures television broadcast, Apr. 30, 1990).
To accomplish this, the character, Reginald Barclay, used the images of several associates in his
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Computer graphics software will undoubtedly influence other areas of law,
such as libel causes of action and other civil issues."6 The question of when

one can use another person's natural or manipulated image for one's own

entertainment will need to be examined.' 67 Individuals whose images are used
without their permission may feel that libel law is insufficient to protect them
However, the legal issues
from what they consider an invasion of privacy.'
of invasion of privacy and libel are normally found in the civil law forum, and
they will therefore not be extensively addressed in this Note."
Computer graphics technology may also affect legal evidentiary issues. The
weight of a picture as evidence will need to be reevaluated, in light of the
mutability of images. 70 Even assuming that a still photograph is authenticated
according to the Federal Rules of Evidence,' the chance will always exist
that it has been altered. A person who claims to have seen what the manipulated
picture represents, and who attests to its accuracy, could be lying. An innocent
witness could be unconsciously intimidated by the visual impact of the image
and by the courtroom atmosphere and be unable to realize the inaccuracies in the

fantasy program and interacted with them in ways that would not have been possible for him in real
life (such as having a romantic interlude with one and bullying others). Id. When the associates
realized that Barclay was using their likenesses in such a manner, they reacted with shock and anger,
even though they were not actually directly harmed by Barclay's diversions. Id. This episode
illustrates the notion that one's privacy is infringed upon when his or her likeness is manipulated
without permission. A similar theme is seen in another popular science fiction television show, Star
Trek: Deep Space Nine. One episode contained a subplot in which a character, Kira, is courted by
a very wealthy person to whom she is not attracted. Star Trek' Deep Space Nine (FOX television
broadcast, Nov. 12, 1994). The person uses his wealth to create a "holosuite" (similar to a
holodeck) program in which he would be able to have sexual intercourse with a virtual reality
representation of Kira, in his own privacy. Id. When Kira discovers this plan, she is outraged and
sabotages the development of the program. Id. These episodes on these popular science fiction
television shows dramatize an important issue--whether such use of another's image for private
fantasy is an intrusion into that person's privacy. See also infra notes 211-223 and accompanying
text.
166. See infra notes 211-23 and accompanying text.
167. See infra notes 211-23 and accompanying text.
168. See infra notes 211-23 and accompanying text.
169. See infra notes 211-23 and accompanying text.
170. See supra part II.A and note 160. Because digital imaging can produce surrealistic,
bizarre, and yet fully believable photolike images, photographic evidence in tomorrow's courtroom
may carry no more credibility than do today's polygraph results. Daniel Grotta, Digital
Photography: Evaluation, POPULAR SC., Sept. 1992, at 62, 64.
171. FED. R. EvID. 901. Authentication of a photograph is typically performed when a
witness, who actually saw what the photograph depicts, testifies that the photograph is an accurate
representation of what the witness truly saw. If a photograph is not properly authenticated, it is
deemed irrelevant and therefore inadmissible. FED. R. EVID. 403.
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picture. Such a witness could then unintentionally authenticate what is, in
reality, a fraudulent picture.72
The recent wrongful death civil action against O.J. Simpson involved an
evidentiary issue like this.'" During the trial, a factual issue existed as to
whether Simpson had either owned or worn a certain type of shoe. 74 A
tabloid newspaper revealed a photograph of Simpson wearing what appeared to
be the shoes, and the picture had apparently been taken a year prior to the civil
trial. 75 Thus, the authenticity of the photograph was at issue in the trial, and
photography experts testified as to whether they believed the image accurately
depicted Simpson wearing the shoes.176 Simpson's defense attorneys attempted

172. This would be a sort of brainwashing experience for the witness, much like Winston is
brainwashed into seeing five fingers on his interrogator's hand in George Orwell's classic novel.
GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR 253-55 (1947). In that novel, the Marxist view of the
mutability of the past is explored in several instances. A particularly relevant passage involves a
photograph of party dissidents, which is viewed by Winston, before it is destroyed. Id. at 250. The
existence of the photograph is the sole proof that the men existed, and when it is destroyed, the men
cease to exist as well, since Winston's memory is dependent on some sort of objective proof. Id.
As applied to virtual child pornography, this logic would hold that virtual child pornography really
is child pornography, and that the event depicted in the image really did occur, even if, in the real
world, it did not. This is a sort of "doublethink," or belief that the image is real, even while
knowing full well that it is fantasy. "Doublethink," as explained by Orwell, is the power to hold
two contradictory beliefs in one's mind's simultaneously and to accept both of them. Id. at 215.
"To tell deliberate lies while genuinely believing in them, to forget any fact that becomes
inconvenient ... [and] to deny the existence of objective reality" are components of doublethink.
Id. at 215-16. A related theme emerged in a science fiction movie from the last decade, BLADE
RUNNER. In that movie, genetically-engineered humans with extraordinary strength and endurance,
called "replicants," were pre-programmed with artificial memories at theircreation. BLADE RUNNER
(Columbia Tri-Star 1982). The replicants often did not know that they were artificially created, and
that their "memories" were false. They were given forged photographs to substantiate their
implanted memories, so that they might not suspect that they were in fact replicants, and not
traditional humans. Id. For the replicants, the memories represented events that truly happened,
even though they were in fact fantasies, or the borrowed memories of real humans. Id.
173. O.J. Simpson was sued in a Santa Monica, California, court for the wrongful death of
Ronald Goldman and his deceased ex-wife, Nicole Brown Simpson, as well as for battery against
Nicole. More Photos Surface of Simpson's Shoes (visited Mar. 7, 1997) < http://www.cnn.com/
US/9612/20/oj.update/index.html>. Ronald Goldman and Nicole Brown Simpson were killed on
June 12, 1994. Id.
174. Simpson argued that he never owned a pair of Bruno Magli shoes. Id. Evidence
suggested that the person who killed Ronald Goldman was wearing such shoes. Expert: Photo of
Simpson
Probably Faked
(visited Mar.
2,
1997)
<http://www.cnn.com/
US/9612/20/oj.update/fake.html >.
175. The photographs of Simpson wearing the shoes were taken on September 26, 1993 by E.J.
Flammer, Jr. at Rich Stadium near Buffalo, New York. "My opinion is [that the photograph] is a
fraud," Simpson replied. See More Photos Surface of Simpson's Shoes, supra note 173.
176. Simpson Photo Analyst Denounced as JFK Conspiracy Buff (visited Mar. 2, 1997)
<http://www.cnn.com/US/9612/18/oj.update/expert.html>. The expert, Robert Groden, testified
in the civil trial that the photograph of Simpson wearing Bruno Magli shoes could have been faked.
Id. Groden, a Dallas photo technician who spent years analyzing pictures of the Kennedy
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to argue that the photograph was altered, therefore challenging the apparent
reality of the image.'" According to this argument, the ability to manipulate
photographs with contemporary technology requires a greater skepticism with
regard to the evidentiary use of images."'
Although virtual child pornography may appear on its face to be identical
to traditional child pornography, a complete legal analysis is required in order
to determine whether virtual child pornography can be proscribed to the same
degree as its real counterpart. Because the production of virtual child
pornography differs substantially from that of real child pornography, which
involves the sexual molestation of a real child, the two types of pornography are
not per se identical. ' Whether they should be treated equally under the law
is therefore a question of constitutional law, as well as public policy.
IV.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

The First Amendment prohibits government from making laws which
However, the Supreme Court has
restrict the freedom of speech." s
acknowledged the government's power to restrict some forms of speech in
One example of such a constitutional restriction on
certain circumstances.'
speech is laws that prohibit child pornography." s Child pornography has no
constitutional protection under the First Amendment,"8 3 but the issue of
whether virtual child pornography is actually child pornography is a
constitutional issue which can ultimately only be answered by the Supreme
Court. I Since the issue of whether virtual child pornography can, or should,

assassination, testified regarding his inspection of the photograph, the negative, and the contact
sheet. See Photo of Simpson ProbablyFaked, supra note 174. He claimed that the original photo
showed what appeared to be "retouching lines" in the area of Simpson's legs. Id. Groden also
testified that the frame of the photo, as seen on the contact sheet, was slightly larger than the rest
of the photographs on the sheet. Id. Superior Court Judge Hiroshi Fujisaki warned the jury not to
conduct its own research on the authenticity of photographs. Id.
177. See Photo of Simpson Probably Faked, supra note 174.
178. Simpson Photo Analyst Denounced as JFK Conspiracy Buff (visited Mar. 2, 1997)
The plaintiff's attacked Groden's
<http://www.cnn.com/US/9612/18/oj.update/expert.html>.
credibility by establishing that he was a high school dropout with no formal training in photography.
Id. Groden apparently was not able to testify as to exactly how the photograph was faked, and he
had difficulty showing the jury which portion was faked. Id. The jury may not have taken Groden's
testimony very seriously, but the fact that the issue of a photograph's authenticity emerged in such
a high-profile trial at all may foreshadow the future of the use of photographs as evidence.
179. See supra notes 9, 91 and accompanying text. See also infra notes 240-41.
180. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
181. See supra note 50.
182. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252 (West 1996).
183. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
184. The meaning of the Constitution and the First Amendment is the exclusive responsibility
of the Supreme Court. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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be treated as real child pornography under the law must be analyzed in light of
the First Amendment, an analysis of the Supreme Court's relevant
interpretations of the First Amendment is needed. These interpretations include
New York v. Ferber, as well as other cases which address the issue of child
pornography. In addition to case law, public policy is an important factor to be
considered in any complete legal analysis of virtual child pornography.
A. An Interest in Preserving the Rights of the Victims
Although the right to free speech is guaranteed by the Constitution," a the
Supreme Court has recognized the need for restrictions on speech in certain
circumstances. However, if the government's limitation on speech is contentbased," a reviewing court must strictly scrutinize the regulation.' 7 The
test for strict scrutiny is three-fold. First of all, the government must have a
legitimate, compelling interest.' 8 Second, the regulation in question must be
Finally, the regulation must actually advance the
narrowly drawn. 8 9
To justify a regulation on the content of
government's interest.' 90
constitutionally protected speech, the government must show that its ends are
compelling and that its means are carefully tailored to achieve those ends.' 9'
The government's interest in protecting the child subjects of pornographic
materials from sexual exploitation by pornographers is clearly compelling.'92
And, because traditional child pornography required the producers to molest
children, the Supreme Court assumed that prohibitions on the possession,
creation or distribution of child pornography would further the state's
This assumption relies on the fact that a ban on even the mere
interest."
possession of child pornography would be a ban on the ownership of evidence
of a criminal act, which is the sexual molestation of the child victim."94 Child
pornography, by the very nature of its origin, was therefore presumed to be a

185. U.S. Const. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press").
186. "Content-based" means discriminatory against either the message or the subject matter of
the speech. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 819 F. Supp. 32 (D.D.C. 1993). See also infra
note 187.
187. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 819 F. Supp. at 42. See also Lighthawk v. Robertson, 812 F.
Supp. 1095 (W.D. Wash. 1993); Calchera v. Procarione, 805 F. Supp. 716 (E.D. Wis. 1992).
188. Lighthawk, 812 F. Supp. at 1098. For other cases which illustrate the Supreme Court's
analysis, see also supra note 187.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Sable Communications v. F.C.C., 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).
192. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982). The government's interest was found
to be overriding, and thus the government met its burden of strict scrutiny. Id.
193. Id.
194. See supra note 9 and infra notes 240-41.
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permanent record of a child's sexual abuse."9 However, with the technology
to create virtual child pornography without the use of real child subjects
becoming more readily available, it is not clear that an anti-virtual
pornography" law will further the government's interest.'
The Supreme Court considered the desire to protect the welfare of child
subjects of pornography to be the overriding government interest in Ferber."5
No direct child victim of computer-generated virtual pornography exists, because
producers do not sexually exploit actual children when they create these
pornographic materials."9 Thus, if Johnson2tu created pictures of imaginary
children, there would be no direct victim. It is not logical to assume that a
regulation on virtual child pornography, which uses only imaginary subjects,
would withstand a constitutional attack under the First Amendment.2"' This
is because the category of child pornography includes only that material which

195. In 1982, when Ferber was decided, personal computers were relatively new and not nearly
as commonplace as they are today. Also, virtual child pornography was not an issue then, because
the software for such manipulation of images was neither sophisticated nor readily available. For
an analysis of how the FerberCourt might respond to virtual child pornography in 1997, see infra
notes 197-202 and accompanying text.
196. For the definition of "virtual child pornography" that is used extensively in this note, see
supra note 30.
197. In Ferber, the government sought to suppress real child pornography, material that was
created only by sexually exploiting child victims, and thus the government's interest was advanced.
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764. Thus, the government may advance its interest by regulation the product
of the sexual exploitation children, and in so doing the government's regulation would have a
chilling effect on the child pornography industry and on further sexual exploitation of children for
child pornography. Id. However, virtual child pornography does not use real children in its
production. See infra part II.A. Thus, the government interest here is more nebulous. But
assuming that the government interest is the same (namely, the protection of children from sexual
exploitation), the relationship between this interest and a ban on virtual child pornography is more
tenuous than the relationship between the government interest and a ban on real child pornography.
But see infra part IV.C. for an analysis of the secondary effects argument against virtual child
pornography.
198. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982).
199. One could argue that although no child is sexually abused in the production of virtual child
pornography, a specific child, or even all children as a class, is exploited when a child's innocent
picture is transformed into a pornographic image. For a discussion of this issue, see infra part IV.C
and accompanying footnotes.
200. See supra part I.
201. Although the overriding government interest could be the protection of children from
sexual exploitation, the government will have a greater difficulty in proving that a ban on virtual
child pornography will further this interest without showing a clear connection between virtual child
pornography and child sexual exploitation. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S.
829, 845 (1978) (holding that a "clear and present danger" test must be met before speech can be
regulated on the basis that it presents a danger to society). See generally infra note 276.
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depicts real children below a certain age. 2°
The reality also exists that Johnson will find it easier to distort and
manipulate pictures of actual children to create his pornography.20 3 In this
case, an indirect victim is created: the child who may suffer emotional trauma
The photograph has a strong
at seeing her face on a pornographic image.'
The notion that "the camera doesn't
psychological power in our culture."
lie," while questionable in light of the new computer imaging technologies,' 6
still has a firm hold on many people.2 7 A child who is falsely depicted as the
subject of virtual pornography would undoubtedly be shocked and humiliated if
he or she discovered such an image."t ~ However, few would argue that

202. Ferber created a new category of unprotected speech, but this new category of child
pornography is very narrow. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764-65 (holding that child pornography includes
only visual, pornographic works involving children). See also infra notes 240-41 for a brief
historical perspective on child pornography in general.
203. Seemingly; it would be easier and faster for a pedophile to tear pictures out of a children's
clothing catalog and simply scan them into his computer than it would be for him to "create" a
completely new image on the computer. Hearing, supra note 32, at 878 (testimony of Chief Postal
Inspector Jeffrey J. Dupilka stating that "[o]ften, we conduct searches in our investigations and we
find photographs of children who are not involved in sexual activity, photographs taken by
pedophiles for their own gratification .... With this new technology, pedophiles can now change
these photographs and make the child a victim without ever having engaged in the activity." Id.
But many people would agree that this is a less dangerous alternative than requiring the pedophile
to actually molest the child in order to create pornography. See infra notes 208 and 228 for insight
into the harms to children with regard to child pornography and child sexual abuse.
204. Bruce Taylor provided the following testimony before Congress:
Arguments that support the notion that since no child was actually sexually exploited in
the production of the image, then the image should not be prosecuted are fallacious.
This is because, first, it ignores the harm caused to a child who is depicted as having
been sexually used .. .and, second, ignores the harm caused to society in general by
the resulting pornography, i.e., the use of pornography in subsequent efforts to sexually
molest children, and the sabotaging of child pornography prosecutions.
Hearing, supra note 32, at 895 (testimony of Bruce Taylor).
205. We live in a visual culture, as evidenced by the fact that more than 60% of our mental
processing power is devoted to visual processing. Charles Grantham, Visualization of Information
Flows, in VIRTUAL REALITY: APPLICATIONS AND EXPLORATIONS 219, 224 (1993).
206. See supra part II.A and accompanying footnotes.
207. See supra note 205.
208. Bruce Taylor testified that:
Using a child's head in an indecent composite image may cause extreme distress to the
children being portrayed in this way, as well as their families. Children whose faces
[have] been perfectly morphed into indecent images may suffer shame, humiliation, and
even more extreme consequences as a result of the apparent child pornographic image.
Hearing, supra note 32, at 896 (testimony of Bruce Taylor). Children will have to be taught to
question the veracity of a photograph, just as they might be instructed not to believe strangers who
offer them rides. For a public policy based analysis of the need for a new paradigm with regard to
photographs, see infra part IV.D. Shirley O'Brien has analyzed what emotive impact a child's
viewing of his own manipulated image has upon him. O'Brien maintains that when a child sees his
image used in pornography, the image: (1) arouses feelings with which the child is unable to cope
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humiliation of this sort is equal to the pain and loss of innocence of actual sexual
abuse. Until society manages to adapt to a new paradigm with regard to the
reality of what is portrayed in photographs, the shock value of this sort of
material will continue to exist."
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has clearly recognized a state's
overriding interest in preventing child sexual abuse,210 it has recognized no such
compelling interest in preventing this sort of emotional distress.2 1 ' The Court
has been clear in its narrow definition of child pornography, 21 2 and it is
unlikely that a state's interest in preventing a potential mental harm will be
enough to justify the expansion of that definition to include virtual child
pornography of real children.2 3 Libel laws, as well as other tort remedies,
offer an alternative course of action for the child who has been depicted in a

because of the child's lack of experience; (2) degrades the child's self-image; (3) suggests that the
child wanted to engage in the conduct and, therefore, is willing to participate in real sexual
experiences; (4) makes the child vulnerable to sexual dependency; (5) inhibits the healthy sexual
functioning in later life; (6) invades the child's privacy; and (7) distorts the child's sense of what is
appropriate behavior. O'BRIEN, supra note 147, at xi-xii.
209. See generally infra part IV.D. The old adage of "believe half of what you see, and
nothing of what you hear" will soon need to be evaluated as computer graphics programs become
more sophisticated and more accessible to the average person. See REPORT, supra note 9, at 612-13.
210. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
211. For insight into the Supreme Court's views on emotional distress and its relation to First
Amendment analysis, see Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988). This case involved a
tort claim by Jerry Falwell, the nationally known minister. Id. at 48. Falwell claimed that a parody
in Hustler magazine caused him emotional distress. Id. at 48-49. The Court, per Chief Justice
Rehnquist, held that public figures and officials who are offended by a parody could not recover for
the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress without a showing of malice. Id. Unlike public
figures and officials such as Jerry Falwell, a child whose image is manipulated with a computer
program is a private person, and that fact, coupled with the general heightened level of protection
accorded to children under the law, should entitle these children to more privacy protection. But
see Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764 (holding that the government has an interest in protecting children, but
from sexual abuse, not humiliation). It is unclear whether a court would recognize a child's right
to recover for emotional distress in this sort of situation. However, the Court has been clear that
speech cannot be made illegal merely because that speech may upset people. See Texas v. Johnson,
491 U.S. 397 (1989) (holding that a state cannot proscribe the burning of the American flag). In
Johnson, Texas asserted two governmental interests: preventing breaches of the peace, and
preserving the flag as a symbol of national unity. Id. at 407. The Court, per Justice Brennan, held
that flag-burning does not constitute "fighting words," so as to satisfy the first interest. Id. at 409.
The second interest did not justify the regulation either because it was not advanced by the
regulation. Id. at 410. Thus, because the First Amendment guarantees the fundamental right to free
speech, that right is afforded great protection; therefore, free speech must be protected, even when
someone's feelings are hurt. See also infra note 217 and accompanying text.
212. See supra note 63.
213. The government will have to show that the amendment to federal child pornography
legislation directly advances the interest of protecting real children from sexual exploitation. See
supra notes 197-201 and accompanying text.
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pornographic episode in which she did not participate.2 14 In recent years
especially, defamation-type actions are handled in the civil courts, as the
criminal court system is used decreasingly to discourage libelous and scandalous
publications."' Although "real" child pornography must be handled by the
appropriate law enforcement officers due to the crimes that occur in their
production,"' using the criminal system to regulate virtual child pornography
on the sole basis that it causes offense or emotional harm is inappropriate, and
contrary to the First Amendment.27
The notion that one can manipulate a picture of another person and make
it appear as though that person posed for pornography, or engaged in
questionable sexual activity, is disturbing to many. 211 The unauthorized use

214. This would require the creation of a new form of libel action and would be based on the
idea that manipulating a picture of someone so that the picture creates the appearance that he did
something that he did not really do is equivalent to making a false statement about a person. But
see infra notes 223-24 and accompanying text. Because people normally accept the veracity of
photographs as they appear, civil courts probably will not view them as mere allegations that
particular events occurred, at least not any time soon. But assuming that tort law grows with
technological advances, aggrieved children should be able to recover under such a theory. See infra
notes 220-24 and accompanying text. Protecting one's reputation against charges of sexual
impropriety is a long-recognized value, and one author has noted: "There is little doubt that
defamations can harm. Standing in the community is of economic value and ...most people want
to be well-regarded. Moreover, having bad things said about oneself is immediately upsetting."
KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, THE USES OF LANGUAGE 322 "(1989). However, if
manipulating someone's picture is treated like written defamation and pursued as a libel action, some
parameters must be considered as well. Id. Greenwalt continued that "damaging remarks about
individuals are within a principle of free speech and are a proper subject of First Amendment
concern .... Some balance needs to be struck between expressive freedom and the need to protect
feeling and reputation from unwarranted attacks." Id. at 323. See also infra note 223.
215. See infra note 220.
216. See supra note 9.
217. The Supreme Court has held that the fact that society may find speech offensive is not a
sufficient reason for suppressing it. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime
Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105 (1991). The Court reasoned: "[I]f it is the speaker's opinion that gives
offense, that consequence is a reason for according it constitutional protection." Id. at 118. See
also supra note 211 and accompanying text.
218. The author recently conducted a survey of approximately 100 persons of various ages and
educational backgrounds. The following questions were asked of each respondent:
1) Would you feel that your privacy had been invaded if, while you were out shopping,
a stranger took a photograph of you without asking for your permission?
2) Would you favor a law that would prohibit anyone from taking a person's picture in
a public place without getting the person's permission, regardless of how, if at all, that
picture is later to be used?
3) Would you feel angry and/or violated if the stranger in Question 1 later used
computer graphics software to manipulate the image of you, so that you appeared to be
involved in offensive or explicit sexual conduct in the photograph?
4) Does your answer to Question 3 depend on whether the manipulated image would be
distributed to a public forum (e.g., published in a magazine or on the Internet)?
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With computer

graphics technology becoming more available and user-friendly every day, it
does not seem too speculative that the computer manipulations of other people's
pictures might become a new form of mischief, just as earlier generations
maliciously told false stories about others, and wrote epithets and phone
numbers on the bathroom walls. 2 19 However offensive this behavior might be,
one would question whether our criminal justice system is equipped to handle
such issues.220
Perhaps it is better to leave issues, such as privacy and defamation, to the
civil courts. Doing this would allow the private individuals who have been
offended by the manipulated pictures to seek their day in court civilly, rather
than criminally. 22' Libel lawsuits can be decided on a case-by-case basis, in
light of case law and the Constitution. Private litigants would therefore have
control over their own cases, instead of relying on the government to pursue
defamation-based causes of action for them.2 22 However, defamation requires
an audience for the offending material, 223 so an individual would have no
cause of action against a person who secretly manipulates that individual's image
and does not publish the altered image in some manner. 2 4

5) Would you support legislation that outlawed the computer-aided manipulation of
another person's image without that person's consent?
6) Would you pursue a civil action (i.e., file a lawsuit) against the stranger in Question
1 if you found out that the person was manipulating your image with computer graphics
software so that you appeared (in the picture) to be engaging in offensive or sexually
explicit conduct?
Virtually every respondent answered "yes" to Questions 3 and 6. In addition, the majority of
respondents answered "no" to Question 4. The remaining questions had varying responses. These
results indicate that many people believe that their privacy is invaded and a "wrong" occurs when
their image is manipulated, even when only in secret, and not when it is published. See supra notes
163-69 and accompanying text.
219. Of course, a person who vandalizes a bathroom wall can be punished for vandalism, but
it is unlikely that he or she will be criminally charged with defamation. See infra note 220.
220. Criminal defamation statutes are not favorites with courts in many jurisdictions. State and
federal district courts have held that even false and defamatory speech is protected by constitutional
protection of free speech. Nyer v. Munoz-Mendoza, 430 N.E.2d 1214 (Mass. 1982); Anderson v.
Dean, 354 F. Supp. 639 (D.C. Ga. 1973); Konigsberg v. Time, Inc., 288 F. Supp. 989 (D.C.N.Y.
1968).
221. See supra note 214.
222. See supra note 214.
223. Defamation is an intentional false communication, either published or publicly spoken, that
injures another's reputation or good name. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 417 (6th ed. 1991)
(emphasis added).
224. Id.
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Criminal regulations on manipulating or distorting the images of others will
have a chilling effect on a wide variety of constitutionally protected
expression.22 Such regulations would therefore be equivalent to "burning the
house to roast the pig." 2 6 However, a more compelling reason for the
Supreme Court to make a legal distinction between virtual child pornography
and real child pornography is that the former does not fall within its own
definition of child pornography, and it should, therefore, remain within the
protection of the First Amendment.227 In order to better understand why
virtual child pornography falls within the protection of the First Amendment,
one must analyze the relevant case law, in particular, Ferber.
B. Applying Ferber to Virtual Child Pornography
Ferberwas a long-overdue step in the right direction toward the protection
of children, the silent minority, who have all too often been ignored and abused
The case involved a
throughout the world, including in the United States.'

225. A blanket ban on the manipulation of the images of others, or on the subsequent publishing
thereof, would serve as a disincentive to those businesses which provide "retouching" of pictures
at the request of the picture's owner. Such bans would also prohibit constitutionally protected
speech which would involve the manipulation of others' images without their consent, such as
political satires and parodies. See generally supra note 100. In reference to the Child Pornography
Prevention Act of 1996, Daniel Katz, legislative counsel for the American Civil Liberties Union,
stated, "What they're going to do is sweep up a great deal of constitutionally protected activity."
Schwartz, supra note 108, at A24. The law could lead to strange results such as allowing the
prosecution of legitimate works, such as the film "Kids," in addition to causing a chilling effect on
future productions based on works such as "Lolita." Id. Regarding prohibitions on pornography
in general, Kent Greenwalt has argued the following:
However confident most of us may be that we can distinguish good literature from
absolute junk, there is something troubling under a regime of free speech about the
government's deciding that some literature and photographs are so bad and so
powerfully attractive that they should actually be forbidden. Embarking on such a
course would seem warranted only if one were deeply worried about the extended effect
of viewing pornography instead of reading good literature.
The claim of justification would [be] . . .that the government should suppress
pornography in order to reduce criminal violence, unhealthy sexual acts, and harmful
attitudes.
GREENAWALT, supra note 214, at 151.
226. F.C.C. v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726,766 (1978) (Justices Brennan and Marshall refer
to this analogy by Justice Stevens in their dissent).
227. See infra notes 239-52 and accompanying text.
228. Regrettably, child abuse and neglect are commonplace in the United States, despite the
relatively high level of public awareness regarding children's rights, as compared to many countries.
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 749 (1982) (calling the exploitative use of children "a serious
national problem"). Child pornography undermines the very fabric of society because it preys on
a culture's weakest member. John C. Scheller, Note, PC Peep Show: Computers, Privacy, and
Child Pornography, 27 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 989, 1012-13 (1994). When children are used to
make pornography, a child is sacrificed for the most perverse of reasons. Id. "The price of an
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balance of the rights of the child subjects of child pornography and the free
speech rights of pornographers.229 Because child subjects rarely have the
power to look out for their own interests, the state's interest in protecting them
is compelling. 2" A child may not be able to resist an adult pornographer who
directs the child to engage in sexual conduct so that the materials can be
Unlike an adult, who chooses to earn a living by posing for
produced.23
pornographic pictures, a child very likely has little choice, and clearly no legal
consent.232
Accordingly, in Ferber,child pornography was found to be without any sort
of First Amendment protection .233 However, the category of speech that the
Court created in Ferber is a deliberately narrow one, consisting only of "works
23
that visually depict sexual conduct by children below a specified age."
235
and
Virtual child pornography does not fall within this narrow definition,
child
as
regulations
to
the
same
it therefore cannot be assumed to be subject
pornography.236 in virtual child pornography, no sexual conduct by children
is occurring, as the images reflect either a completely imaginary child, or a real
child, but one who has not engaged in any sexual conduct. Thus, the images are
"virtual" as opposed to "real." The images only appear to represent real child
pornography, but they are, in fact, different, practically and legally. 237

adult's sexual satisfaction is a profound loss of innocence." Id. at 1013.
229. The child's rights prevailed. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764-66 (1982).
230. In some circumstances, a level of governmental paternalism is necessary. Children, by
the virtue of their age and inexperience, are usually not able to defend themselves from exploitation
and abuse, and often their family structures offer no protection. The government therefore has a
compelling interest in protecting children from sexual exploitation. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764.
231. Id.
232. But see supra note 159, in which Catherine MacKinnon argues that adult women are
similarly exploited through pornography.
233. Ferber,458 U.S. at 764.
234. Id.
235. See infra notes 239-52 and accompanying text.
236. It is unlikely that the FerberCourt, and later the Osborne Court, considered the problem
of computer-generated images that are virtually indistinguishable from depictions of real children.
Johnson, supra note 32, at 326.
237. The "virtual" vs. "real" argument is explored in virtual reality texts. See supranote 160.
Most people are able to distinguish between reality and fantasy in their everyday lives, but when the
"virtual" becomes so lifelike that it almost passes for the real, it can be easy to assume that there
is "virtually" no difference between the two. Computer-manipulated images are like virtual reality
in that they confuse the senses, even to the point where the viewer believes that what she is seeing
is in fact a "real" representation of an event that has actually occurred. Id. However, it does not
logically follow that, just because the senses are confused, the "virtualness" can be ignored. See
supra notes 159, 172.
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Child pornography is an extremely narrow category of unprotected speech,
which only includes visual depictions of sexual performances by children.238
It does not include written accounts of such sexual performances; 39 nor does
it include sculptures, paintings, or drawings, no matter how skillfully
rendered. 2" Virtual child pornography is like a drawing or painting in some

regards, as it is a two-dimensional visual creation of a fictitious account of a
"
' However, the problem lies with the
sexual performance involving a child.24
realism of virtual pornography in contrast to the average painting, which is
easily seen as a non-real account.242 People assume that pictures portray real
events, and therefore, a skillfully manipulated photograph is easily mistaken as
an account of a real event.2 43 This level of realism in virtual pornography
could be a deadly obstacle for law enforcement officers, who would not be sure
if a suspected pornographer's collection was produced using real children or
not. 2" Federal law has dealt with this problem by assuming that, if the

238. See infra note 239.
239. "LT]he distribution of descriptions or other depictions of sexual conduct, not otherwise
obscene, which do not involve live performance or photographic or other visual reproduction of live
performances, retains First Amendment protection." New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764-65
(1982).
240. It has been noted that:
Drawings of children engaged in sexual intercourse with adults date back at least from
ancient Greece, and a graphic written description of child sexual abuse was to be found
in seventeenth century France. Yet although these portrayals or accounts might be
deemed "obscene"; and although they deeply offend modem sensibilities regarding the
rearing and protection of children they are not "child pornography" in the specific legal
and clinical sense that term has acquired . . . . It is clear from the [Ferber] Court's
language, and in all statutory and scholarly definitions of the term, that 'child
pornography is only appropriate as a description of material depicting real children."
REPORT, supra note 9, at 596-97. The Report continues: "[A] rewrite of LOLITA which included
graphic descriptions of sexual activity with a young girl could never be 'child pornography', nor
could a fully explicit film of the novel which starred an adult actress playing the part of the young
girl." Id. at 598.
241. In contrast to real child pornography, which requires a real child to be engaged in sexual
conduct while the producer records the acts in some sort of visual medium, virtual child
pornography requires only the imagination and computer skills of the producer. See supra notes
32-42 and accompanying text. See SCHELLER, supra note 228, at 999 (stating that "[t]he 'person'
[depicted in virtual child pomography]... is created by the computer, and does not actually exist").
The images therefore do not exploit actual children. Id.
242. It is hard to imagine a person in our time period taking a painting of a person riding a
horse, as irrebuttable proof that the person did in fact ride a horse. Yet many people would assume
a photograph to provide that exact level of proof, even while knowing that such photographs can be
altered, manipulated, etc. See supra part III and accompanying footnotes.
243. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. But see infra note 244.
244. Hearing, supra note 32, at 894 (statement by Bruce Taylor arguing that "[flurthermore,
if it is not obvious that the image is a composite the child and its family may have to be investigated
to discover whether or not abuse of the child had actually occurred.") It is frightening to imagine
that the issue of whether a child was sexually abused or not would not be of paramount concern to
law enforcement officers, if they find a child's picture among those in a pedophile's collection. One
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pornographic material appears to be child pornography, then it is child
pornography.245
However, this over-simplified solution does not pass
constitutional muster because it expands the narrow category of unprotected
speech created in Ferber to cover materials which are substantially different
from those proscribed in that case. 2
In making its ruling, the Ferbercourt considered the various harms of child
pornography which justified barring it from any First Amendment
protection. 247 Importantly, it did not rely on any paternalistic state interest in
protecting society, or individuals, from using or being exposed to child
pornography. 48 The harms that it did consider include the physiological,
emotional and mental health problems that sexually exploited children
experience.249 In addition, when Ferber was decided, pornographic materials
were a permanent record of a crime: the sexual abuse of the child." 0

could question whether the opportunity to avoid such investigative work is really the sort of
government interest that the Supreme Court might acknowledge.
245. Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (1994). See supra notes
96-98.
246. If the Supreme Court deems virtual child pornography to be different from real child
pornography, then the Ferberanalysis would not control, and the government would have to meet
the strict scrutiny test in order for the federal amendment to withstand First Amendment attack. See
supra notes 186-91 and accompanying text. Thus, the government would have to show that its
interest, the protection of children from sexual exploitation, is directly advanced by a ban on
computer-manipulated images which do not involve the sexual abuse of real children. Id. For
reasons explored throughout this note, it is unlikely that the government would be able to meet this
test.
247. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
248. Ferber,458 U.S. at 757. The prevention of the sexual exploitation and abuse of children
was the primary governmental interest. Id.
249. Catherine A. MacKinnon argues that women who pose for pornography experience similar
emotional harm as a result of the depersonalizing nature of the industry. She maintains that
"[s]omething is done when women are used to-make pornography, and then something is done again
and again to those same women whenever their violation-their body, face, name, whatever of
identity and dignity can be stolen and sold as sex-is sexually enjoyed, in whatever medium."
MacKinnon, supra note 159, at 1960-61. Child subjects of pornography are also seen as sexual
objects, existing in a photograph for the sexual gratification of a pedophile. See supra note 228.
MacKinnon elaborates: "If the materials were non-sexual libel, or the persons involved were
understood to be persons rather than prostitutes or sex or 'some women' who are 'like that,' the
damage done would be clear." MacKinnon, supra note 159, at 1960-61.
250. Senator Biden argued the following regarding child pornography and abuse:
The pornographer involves children in conduct they should not have any part in and then
creates a record of that abuse, which in many cases he shares with others, and in many
cases ruins forever the life of the child involved. The abuse of the children involved
does not end when their participation in making pornography ends; it continues as long
as the record of the material exists and . . . as long as their memory persists.
Hearing,supra note 32, at 873 (testimony of Senator Biden). See also Scheller, supra note 228,
at 1013.
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Clearly, the Supreme Court acknowledged the state's interest in preventing
these harms."' But in virtual child pornography, no sexual exploitation of2
children is present. No sexual crime against the child exists to record."1
With the exception of the possible emotional harm to a depicted child as
mentioned above," 3 no direct harm results in producing virtual child
pornography." 4 Although insistent arguments are made based on the alleged
secondary effects of pornography on particular classes of people,255 the
Supreme Court did not give weight to these speculative considerations when
making its ruling on child pornography." 6 Therefore, it would seem that,
under Ferber, the government does not have the same overriding interest in
prohibiting the production of pornographic images which do not require the
abuse of real children." 7 Merely assuming that virtual child pornography can

251. New York's interest was overriding. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757 (1982).
252. Although the Attorney General's Report on child pornography did not consider virtual
child pornography, its emphasis of the particular characteristics of child pornography help in
analyzing whether the computer-manipulated images are child pornography. REPORT, supra note
9, at 406 ("The inevitably permanent record of that sexual activity created by a photograph is rather
plainly a harm to the children photographed. But even if the photograph were never again seen, the
very activity involved in creating the photograph is itself an act of sexual exploitation of children
.... "). Thus, the Attorney General emphasized the fact that traditional child pornography is a
permanent record of a crime, and not a mere pornographic picture. Id. See also Marci A. Hamilton
et al., Panel Discussion, Regulating the Internet: Should Pornography Get a Free Ride on the
Information Superhighway?, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 343, 351 (1996) ("[Tlhe only reason
child pornography laws have withstood constitutional scrutiny is because they have been prohibitions
on conduct rather than content."). See also supra note 9 and accompanying text. Finally, Postal
Chief Dupilka testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee: "Child pornography is not an art
form. It is documented evidence of sexual molestation and abuse in the continuing victimization of
children." Hearing, supra note 32, at 878 (testimony of Jeffrey J. Dupilka).
. 253. For an analysis of the role of this consideration in a potential judicial evaluation of the
legality of computer-generated child pornography, see supra notes 208-28 and accompanying text.
254. But see Johnson, supra note 32, at 327 for the argument against this conclusion. Johnson
maintains that "[t]here are reasons why the possession of such images, even though not directly
exploiting children in their creation, should be constitutionally prohibited. Because of the quality
of computer-generated images, the gravity of the harm in possessing such images is so great as to
override the individual's interests in possession."
Id. Under this argument, virtual child
pornography can be legally distinguished from a mere drawing or painting, because its realism is
so extreme that it appears to be an actual record of real children engaging in sexual performance.
But see supra notes 240-41. See also Hamilton, supra note 252, at 361 ("I will be surprised if the
Supreme Court . . . fails to recognize some level of protection for children as a class against vivid
wholesale depictions of acts that would be harmful if they involved a specific flesh and blood child
instead of a digitized image.").
255. For a more detailed analysis of the secondary effects argument against pornography, see
Section IV.C. and accompanying footnotes.
256. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). See also Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103
(1990).
257. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764 ("[T]he nature of the harm to be combated requires that the state
offense be limited to works that visually depict sexual conduct by children below a specified age").
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be prohibited under Ferber is not consistent with the Court's reasoning. 8 A
9
law based on such an assumption, in addition to being unduly presumptive,1
would therefore be unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court should hold that virtual child pornography may not be
constitutionally proscribed on its face, due to the material's substantive
differences from real child pornography. 2 ° However, this issue clearly cannot
be ignored, due to the potential problems that the new technology presents to
law enforcement officers."' The federal child pornography statute needs an
effective, but reasonable, amendment in order to allow prosecutors to enforce

258. It would appear that a separate compelling government interest needs to be established,
because virtual child pornography is not identical to those materials which the Supreme Court held
can be illegal per se. See supra notes 9, 240-41 and accompanying text. Child pornography is
produced using a real child who is sexually abused, and virtual child pornography does not involve
the sexual exploitation of children. See supra notes 9, 240-41 and accompanying text. For a
background on how virtual child pornography is created, in contrast to real child pornography, see
also part II.A. One commentator emphasizes the need for proof of harm that the virtual
pornography causes before it can be prohibited:
Some have questioned the legality of computer-generated images of children in sexual
poses or of morphed images of adults rendered to appear childlike on the computer
screen. I believe that to establish that such images are illegal, it is necessary to show
beyond question that the viewing of these images of children .
is dangerous to the
welfare of children.
Branscomb, supra note 145, at 1946.
259. To say that something imaginary is real, for the purposes of a law, appears to be a clumsy
sort of legal doublethink. See supra note 172. We may criminalize the possession of a substance
which looks like cocaine to support the policies behind the anti-drug laws and to promote the
efficiency of law enforcement officers. See, e.g., Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 720 § 570/404(b-d) (1996) ("It
is unlawful for any person knowingly to possess a look-alike substance. Any person who violates
this subsection (c) is guilty of a petty offense ....
In any prosecution brought under this Section,
it is not a defense ... that the defendant believed the look-alike substance actually to be a controlled
substance"). But we would never try to fool ourselves into believing that it truly does not matter
whether a suspect is selling cocaine, or baking powder, to his customers. For example, Illinois' law
provides a minor penalty for possession of a look-alike controlled substance, compared to the typical
felony penalties facing those who possess real controlled substances. Id. at § 570/404(c).
Apparently some state courts do not subscribe to the doublethink that laces the Child Pornography
Prevention Act, at least not with regard to child pornography. See supra notes 96-98, 172 and
accompanying text. And more interestingly, while a criminal who sells baking powder, believing
it to be cocaine, has the same mens rea as a more competent drug dealer, the law would never
punish a chef because he keeps baking powder in his refrigerator. Such a result would be
nonsensical, yet many would advocate treating computer-manipulated pictures, which appear to be
child pornography, as illegal per se, requiring no proof of either a defendant's desire to harm
children or his suspicion that the pictures were produced using real children. See supra notes 96-98,
172 and accompanying text.
260. See supra note 258 and accompanying text.
261. Virtual child pornography, due to its resemblance to real child pornography, may make
enforcement of existing child pornography laws difficult. See supra notes 42, 203. For a proposed
alternative, see infra next section.
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the current regulations against child pornography.262 But an amendment to the
current legislation must conform to the First Amendment.
A legal analysis of the issue of virtual child pornography is not complete
merely by applying past case law to the legal issues presented by the new
computer technology. It is also important to realize that the Supreme Court may
consider other factors in making a ruling on the constitutionality of the new
federal amendment to the child pornography statute. These factors may include
the secondary effects argument, as well as issues of public policy.
C. The Secondary Effects Argument
Another factor to be considered in the issue of virtual child pornography is
the secondary effects argument. Proponents of this argument maintain that any
sort of pornography, especially that which involves images of children, is so
lacking of any value and harmful per se to society that it can and should be
proscribed. Supporters of this position claim that the government has several
valid interests in protecting society from the possible indirect effects of child
pornography.
1. Prevention of Seduction of Children as a Governmental Interest
One of the indirect effects of child pornography is that the materials may
be used to aid in the seduction of real children. 21
The argument for
suppression of virtual child pornography on this ground does not claim that the
2
material is child pornography under the traditional constitutional analysis. 1
Rather, this argument maintains that the material should be regulated because of
its potential to be used for illegal purposes. 2" The Supreme Court, however,

262. See infra part V.
263. Many opponents of adult pornography also argue that the secondary effects of such
materials is sufficient to justify bans on pornography. "The state's interest in eliminating child
pornography is the protection of all children." Scheller, supra note 228, at 1000 (emphasis added).
Scheller notes that child pornography necessarily includes child abuse. Id. (citing in part REPORT,
supra note 9, at 406).
264. REPORT, supra note 9, at 649. See also supra notes 152-56 and accompanying text.
265. The argument in favor of suppression of virtual child pornography on this ground is based
on the effects of the material on others. Scheller, supra note 228, at 996 n.46 ("One argument is
that pornography is a social evil and is debilitating to human sexuality").
266. This argument is consistent with state laws that prohibit the possession of burglary tools,
theft-shielding devices, "boxes" which are used in the theft of telephone services, and other such
contraband which, while harmless on its own, is used primarily for illegal purposes. E.g., ALASKA
STAT. § 11.46.315 (1995) (proscribing the possession of burglary tools); ALA. CODE § 13A-7-8
(1996) (same); 720 ILL. REV. STAT. § 5/16-15 (1996) (proscribing the possession of theft-shielding
devices); CAL. PENAL CODE § 502.7(a)(5) (West 1997) (proscribing the possession of devices that
are used to make telephone calls without paying for them); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.808(3) (Law.
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did not allow a complete ban on child pornography on the ground that it is a
seductive tool, even though it knew that the material could be used for seductive
purposes at the time.267 The U.S. Attorney General acknowledged the danger
of child pornography being used for this purpose, 2" but also noted that adult
pornography is used for the same purpose,269 and would therefore not
recommend restrictions on child pornography based solely on its seductive
qualities.27
Although virtual child pornography may possess an even greater potential
to seduce children, it still does not involve the sexual exploitation of actual
children in its production.27 Thus, the compelling governmental interest in
shielding children from such exploitation is not present.112 It is doubtful that
the governmental interest in preventing the vaguely speculated use of virtual
child pornography in the seduction of children would justify a ban on virtual

Co-op. 1996) (same). But in addition to having potentially legal purposes, such as personal sexual
stimulation, virtual child pornography would appear to be a form of speech. New York v. Ferber,
458 U.S. 747 (1982). The Supreme Court here held that the government had a compelling interest,
and that it was therefore able to proscribe real child pornography. Child pornography was therefore
deemed to be speech, but it was not afforded First Amendment protection. Id. Therefore, assuming
that the images do not violate the local or state obscenity standards, they would appear to be entitled
to First Amendment protection. Id. at 764. See supra note 257.
267. See supra note 121.
268. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
269. See REPORT, supra note 9, at 411 n.74:
We note that there seems to be significant use of adult sexually explicit material for the
same purpose. Child molesters will frequently show sexually explicit pictures of adults
to children for the purpose of convincing a child that certain practices are perfectly
acceptable because adults engage in them with some frequency ...
Id. See also Hamilton, supra note 254, at 352 ("[S]ometimes children can be seduced by nothing
more dangerous than a suggestion that 'we meet at the corner for an ice cream cone' or 'just to
talk'"). Id.
270. REPORT, supra note 9, at 411 n.74. The Attorney General's Report acknowledged the
practice of seducing children through use of child pornography, but did not "take the phenomenon
as sufficient to justify restrictions [it] would not otherwise endorse." Id. Instead of regulations,
education was seen to be the key to protecting children against this sort of tactic. Id. ("[W]e
strongly urge that children be warned about the practice in the course of whatever warnings about
sexual advances by adults are being employed"). The child seduction issue was a small factor in
the Report's treatment of the entire child pornography issue. Adelman, supra note 19, at 491.
Although the use of child pornography for seductive purposes should not be ignored or trivialized,
the issue must not be allowed to draw legislators' attention away from constitutional practicalities.
See generally supra parts IV.A and IV.B.
271. Real children are not sexually abused in order to create virtual child pornography. See
supra part II.A and accompanying footnotes. Virtual child pornography, like a fictional story or
drawing, is an imaginative simulation of an event that did not occur. See supra note 240. Thus,
it is fantasy, as opposed to real child pornography, which does record a sexual crime scene. Id.
See also supra note 9.
272. The issue of whether a secondary effects argument would be valid is explored later in this
note. See infra notes 276-301 and accompanying text.
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child pornography."
In order to restrict virtual child pornography on this
ground, the government interest would have to meet a proximity test 274 in
which the threat of the use of the material for seductive purposes would have to
be shown to be real and imminent, and not mere speculation.275 Before speech
can be prohibited, the danger must not be remote, or even probable-it must
cause immediate peril. 76
Virtual child pornography does not require the sexual exploitation of a real
child in its production, and this factor makes the images substantially different
from real child pornography. 27
If the mere possession of virtual child
pornography cannot be proscribed constitutionally,27 other regulatory tactics
would have to be implemented to prevent the illegal use of the images. 279 A
pedophile could be found with what is clearly virtual child pomography 2'° and,
under the amended federal statute proposed in this Note, could manage to
exonerate himself or herself from a child pornography-related prosecution.2
However, the pedophile could still be charged with attempted sexual assault if

273. Adelman, supra note 19, at 491 ("[There is strong argument that the Final Report stands
for precisely the opposite result of the conclusion for which the advocates of the suppression of
computer-generated child pornography have cited it. It may well be that a similar Commission
meeting in 1996 would conclude that the suppression of computer-generated images is necessary,
but that result cannot be presumed.").
274. See infra note 276.
275. See infra note 276.
276. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 843 (1978). The Supreme
Court established parameters for a proximity test which needs to be met before speech can be
regulated on the basis that the speech presents a danger to society. The "clear and present danger"
test requires an actual, threatened public interest, which is not doubtful or remote. Thomas v.
Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945). If this test is met, a limitation on speech is justified. Dennis
v. United States, 71 S. Ct. 857 (1951). Under this test, a court must inquire in each "case whether
the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is
necessary to avoid the danger." Id. at 510. The Supreme Court has also noted that the clear and
present danger exception to the First Amendment may not be used indiscriminately. Feiner v. New
York, 340 U.S. 315, 320-21 (1951) (holding that although the state has the power to prevent or
punish when there is a clear and present danger of an immediate threat to public safety, peace, or
order, it may not unduly suppress free speech under the guise of conserving desirable conditions).
277. See supra notes 9, 252. See also New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982).
278. Even if the material in question (virtual child pornography) were found to be obscene, the
Supreme Court has held that a state cannot proscribe the private possession of obscene materials in
one's own home. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969).
279. Illegal uses of the images would include using the images to seduce children for the
purpose of sexual abuse. REPORT, supra note 9, at 649. See also infra note 283.
280. The fact that the material is virtual child pornography, and not real child pornography,
would be determined by the defendant's ability to sufficiently prove that the material was created
without any sexual abuse of real children. For the details of the proposed amendment to the federal
child pornography statute, see generally infra part V.
281. See infra part V.
I
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he or she tries to use the material to seduce a child. 2n Nevertheless, to
attempt to regulate virtual child pornography on the basis that it may be used for
illegal purposes, when its possession cannot be regulated otherwise, is overly
broad. 2" To succeed, a regulation would have to be narrow; a state could
prohibit the possession of virtual child pornography while on school grounds,
or in parks, or in other areas where young children could be solicited.2' But,
it could not ban the possession of virtual child pornography in one's home, just
as it cannot prohibit such private possession of obscenity. 28 Just as a state
cannot criminalize the publication of a rape victim's name based on the
possibility that the information might be used to further illegal actions, 2" it
cannot prohibit virtual child pornography based on the possibility that the
material might be improperly used.287
2. Virtual Child Pornography as an Incitement to Sexual Crimes
Another alleged secondary effect of child pornography is that it causes
susceptible persons to sexually molest children.288 Under this theory, the state
must not only protect the child subjects of the pornography itself, but also those
children who may be sexually abused by a pedophile who is somehow spurred
to action by viewing child pornography.289 Opponents see this interest as
282. See supra note 279. See also infra note 283.
283. A distinction needs to be maintained between fantasy and action. See Symposium, supra
note 65, at 316. Dave Browde has said the following:
[Slomeone attacking children is one thing, but discussing it is another. I wonder
whether we might be tempted to go too far because of the perception that there is a
greater threat imposed by this new technology which is going to make pedophilia easier.
But it doesn't really make pedophilia easier. Someone still has to commit a crime, and
it is at that point that I suspect law enforcement will still be effective and will still be
able to act.
Id.
284. But see Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). The Supreme Court has been suspicious
of paternalistic governmental interests in protecting the minds of adults. Id. at 566.
285. Id. at 568.
286. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
287. A proximity and degree test would be required. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47,
52 (1919). See also supra note 276. Although the degree of harm here is substantial (the sexual
abuse of a child), there is little connection between a pornographic image and sexual seduction.
Hamilton, supra note 252, at 352 (stating that a child may be seduced by the suggestion that he or
she meet with the pedophile for ice cream).
288. Johnson, supra note 32, at 327-28. See also notes 297-316 and accompanying text.
289. Scheller, supra note 228, at 1000. Scheller claims that the abuse that occurs in the
production of child pornography does not end with the depiction of the child because pedophiles use
child pornography to aid in the sexual abuse of children. Id. According to this line of thinking, the
producer of child pornography in general, not the sexual pervert who views it and then goes on to
molest a child, is to blame for the child's sexual abuse. It is, therefore, the pornography itself that
is evil for its power over its viewers. This theory is forward-looking and speculative: the sexual
abuse which occurred in the production of the pornography is not the root of its evil, but rather, the
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overly-paternalistic and maintain that the government is not responsible for
controlling the thoughts of its citizens." °
The Supreme Court has been reluctant to consider the government's interest
in protecting minds from offense, distress, or indirect influence as a result of
viewing child pornography. 29" ' In its rulings on child pornography, the Court
has considered only the state's interest in protecting the child subjects of the
pornography from sexual exploitation. 2" The Court has specifically ruled that
"[whatever the power of the state to control public dissemination of ideas
inimical to the public morality, it cannot constitutionally premise legislation on
the desirability of controlling a person's private thoughts."293 It is unlikely
that the Court will change its position on how far government can go in
regulating private, albeit unpopular or frightening, 2" media, because the Court

Scheller continues by stating that:
danger lies in how its viewers may react to it.
[The act of child pornography is not an end in itself. Rather it sets the foundation for
acts more vile. Photography, film and computers attempt to capture a perfect and true
picture of reality. These media are forever inferior to the behavior and images they
depict. Consequently, child prostitution, abduction, and even murder can result from
the unsatiated appetite of the voyeur.
Id. at 1013.
290. Schwartz, supra note 108, at A24; GREENAWALT, supra note 214, at 151. Whether
RICHARD F. HIXSON,
pornography causes sexual abuse is the subject of much debate.
PORNOGRAPHY AND THE JUSTICES 5 (1996) ("[Tjhere is not much support for the fear that exposure
[to pornography] leads to new or higher levels of sexual activity or to changes in an individual's
established sexual behavior."). President Carter's Commission concluded that there is no evidence
that exposure to explicit sexual materials causes delinquent or criminal behavior. Id. In fact, some
argue that pornography is less arousing than one's own imagination. Id. at 5-6. Although antipornography activists argue that adult pornography leads to increased sexual attacks on women,
many scholars feel differently. For example, Ellen Willis, a leading feminist in New York City,
stated, "[If Hustler were to vanish from the shelves tomorrow, I doubt that rape or wife-beating
statistics would decline." Id. at 210. "Feminists against pornography have done a sad and awful
thing," another scholar claims, "they have made women into objects." Id. at 209 (quoting Sallie
Tisdale).
291. The leading case on the secondary effects argument against child pornography is Osborne.
Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990). Osborne followed Ferber and held that the private
possession of child pornography in one's home can be proscribed. Id. at 111. The Court
distinguished this case from Stanley (in which the individual's right to privately possess obscene
materials in his own home was acknowledged), by emphasizing the unique harm to children who are
involved with the production of child pornography, and the state's overriding interest in preventing
the production of such material. Id. at 110. Osborne also noted that the state did not rely on a
paternalistic interest in protecting the defendant's mind. Id. at 109.
292. Id.
293. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 566 (1969).
294. Recently, the Court ruled that the mere fact that a particular message or form of speech
might be offensive to some does not deprive it of its First Amendment protection. Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 408-09 (1989). Indeed, if the First Amendment only applied to popular
speech, we might not need it, much as other amendments would be useless if they only applied to
the favored, majority classes. See also supra note 211.
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has acknowledged, in a case with many parallels, that individuals have a right
to view obscenity in their own homes.219 The secondary effects argument has
surfaced not only with regard to child pornography, but also with adult
pornography, violence on television, and the lyrics of rap and heavy metal
musicians."
The premise of the argument is that some forms of speech
present a clear, but not always imminent, and certainly not direct, danger of
causing people to act criminally.'l
Such forms of speech should be
suppressed, therefore, due to their lack of social value, much like fighting words
and libel are treated now.29
Under this theory, a violent television show

could be suppressed because it may influence someone to later commit a violent
act. 299

295. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 566. As the secondary effects of pornography have not been
acknowledged by the Court, and discredited to some degree in Stanley and Osborne, it does not
seem likely that the Court will now change its mind and hold that the private possession of virtual
child pornography can be proscribed. Of course, the state's power to regulate the distribution of
virtual child pornography, if it is obscene, is another matter. But see GREENAWALT, supra note 214,
at 151.
296. Tony Mauro, 'Can'tHold Media Liable,' but LitigantsStill Trying, USA TODAY, Oct. 21,
1993, at 2A; Eric Johnson, Regional News, Study Links Suicide, Heavy Metal, U.P.I., Apr. 5, 1994
(acknowledging a study based on the circulation of a heavy metal magazine and the suicide rates of
persons aged 15-24); Kurt Sevick, Searching for Blame? Parents Should Find a Mirror, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar. 16, 1994, at 2. See also Walt Disney Prods. v. Shannon, 276 S.E.2d
580 (Ga. 1981) (holding that a television studio was not responsible for a child's death when the
child attempted to imitate a stunt performed on The Tonight Show). See Vitauts M. Gulbis,
Annotation, Liability for Personal Injury or Death Allegedly Resulting from Television or Radio
Broadcast, 20 A.L.R. 4th 327 (1983).
297. See Johnson, supra note 32, at 327-28 ("[P]rohibiting the possession of computergenerated child pornography will prevent sex crimes on children."). But see Dershowitz, supra note
19, at B7. Clearly, the question of what effect pornography has on the viewer is still unresolved.
See supra notes 289-90 and accompanying text. See also CREWDSON, supra note 61, at 245. "[A]
commission appointed by President Nixon concluded that pornography had no significant effect on
the viewer." Id. at 246. These conclusions were backed up by scientific research, but President
Reagan appointed a new commission which concluded that viewing some forms of violent
pornography contributes to violent behavior. Id. This commission used no quantitative research
of its own, but instead relied on the testimony of experts who were involved with law enforcement.
A few social scientists testified that viewing pornography had no perceptible effect on sexual
behavior, but the commission ignored them. Id. Judith Becker of the New York Psychiatric
Institute was quoted as saying, "I've been working with sex offenders for eleven years and I would
think that if there were a link between pornography and sexual behavior, we would have found it
before now." Id. See also Adelman, supra note 19, at 491 ("[Federal legislation] will criminalize
the activity of many computer users who will never engage in acts of sexual abuse.").
298. See supra notes 48-50, 211-24 and accompanying text.
299. See supra note 296. The basis for the secondary effect argument is illustrated in the
following quote by David Holbrook:
[F]or any action to be taken against [pornography], we must show that it has socially harmful
results, by showing that some actual obscene work has an effect which is demonstrable in the
behaviour of a certain person, and those acts which follow must actually be anti-social or
debasing to that person.
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While it is naive to maintain that violent song lyrics and pornography do
not influence listeners and viewers," without a clear causal link between the
expression and the violent behavior of the listeners and viewers, the regulation
of the unpopular speech falls outside of the government's domain."0
The
government is not designed to act as "Big Brother," protecting its citizens from
their own thought crimes.'
Our criminal justice system is designed to punish
those who act on criminal urges, not those who have fantasies but do nothing to
act them out, or those who simply encourage such fantasies.3

DAVID HOLBROOK, THE CASE AGAINST PORNOGRAPHY 5 (1973). In the case of virtual child
pornography, the possession and viewing of the images must be found to contribute to sexual crimes
against real children. See infra notes 301-03.
300. If there was no psychological influence at all, the materials (music and magazines) would
probably not be in such high demand, as the use of them would be pointless. However, it is not
clear whether the use of violent and pornographic media creates criminal minds, or merely provides
a safe outlet for existing anti-social thoughts. See supra notes 289-97.
301. A clear link between pornography and sexual abuse has not yet been established. See
supra notes 289-97. If sufficient proof could be established that the dissemination of virtual child
pornography will lead to additional acts of sexual abuse, strict regulations on the fabricated images
could be justified, yet no evidence has been established. Adelman, supra note 19, at 488-89 (citing
to Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2470 (1994)). Adelman notes that a
government's regulation of speech, as a means to prevent anticipated harm, must be proved to be
capable of actually advancing the state's compelling interest in stopping the harm. Id. No evidence
is available that supports the proposition that proscribing even real child pornography leads to fewer
acts of sexual abuse of children. See CREWDSON, supra note 61, at 246 ("[While graphic
pornography featuring children first became commercially available ... there appears to be nothing
new about sex crimes against children. Nor does there seem to be a connection in other cultures
where such pornography has been even more widely available."). James Fallows, a former
speechwriter for Jimmy Carter, who recently moved his family to Japan, demonstrated the
implausibility of the secondary effects argument when he noted that although more and more people
in the United States are claiming that pornography contributes to sexual crimes, Japan has a high
level of violent stimulation, but a low incidence of reported rapes and assaults. Id.
302. In his classic novel, George Orwell has depicted what life would be like when a totalitarian
government controlls every aspect of its population, and mere anti-government sentiment, without
action, was punishable. He wrote:
Thoughts and actions which, when detected, mean certain death are not formally
forbidden, and the endless purges, arrests, tortures, imprisonments, and vaporizations
are not inflicted as punishment for crimes which have actually been committed, but are
merely the wiping-out of persons who might perhaps commit a crime at some time in
the future.
ORWELL, supra note 172, at 212.
303. The actus reus, or "guilty act," has always been an essential element in establishing
culpability in the criminal law. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 23 (6th ed. 1991). See also supra note
93 regarding mens rea, or "guilty mind." Fantasizing about a crime is never enough. See infra
note 307. Creating real child pornography requires the guilty act of molesting a real child, but
virtual child pornography does not. See supra note 9. Dee Jepsen, president of Enough is Enough,
stated in her testimony before the Senate that virtual child pornography is not a harmless activity
because "fishermen read fishing magazines . . . and generally go fishing. It is only logical that
those who view child pornography wish to act out that which they have viewed." Hearing, supra
note 32, at 989 (testimony of Dee Jepsen). Under this approach, our hypothetical Jones would not
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The question of when a fantasy is dangerous enough, if ever, to allow the
government to intervene and regulate the speech involved is not an easy one to
An interesting recent federal case involved a University of
answer. 304
Michigan student who wrote violent pornographic stories about a classmate,
using her real name and physical description and then posted them on
exist, since he merely enjoys looking at child pornography, but has never molested a child. See
supra part I. Jepsen's logic is flawed, because it ignores the difference between fantasy and reality.
See supra notes 172, 237 and accompanying text. A person who fantasizes about an act of violence,
or a sexual crime, will not necessarily act upon the stimulation. Dershowitz, supra note 19, at B7.
If this were not the case, countries like Sweden and Holland, with much larger pornography
industries, would have much higher sexual crime rates. CREWDSON, supra note 61, at 246. The
argument that a person will act out the sexual fantasies of the pornography that he views needs to
be evaluated in light of the studies on the causes of child sexual abuse. See KATHLEEN C. FALLER,
UNDERSTANDING CHILD SEXUAL MALTREATMENT (1990). Faller cites two prerequisites for sexual
abuse: (1) sexual arousal to children, and (2) the willingness to act upon the arousal. Id. at 55-64.
Faller mentions several circumstances that can increase the probability of sexual abuse, but notes
that these factors cannot by themselves cause sexual maltreatment. Id. at 58-61. These factors
include fantasy about sexual activity, but Faller points out that a larger number of people have sexual
responses to children than actually act them out. Id. at 56. A study of male college students found
that 21% of the respondents reported having experienced sexual attraction to children, yet it is
unlikely that one fifth of the male population sexually abuses children. Id. Faller also gives several
psychological factors which might cause a person to act out his sexual fantasies about children. Id.
This supports the conclusion that no direct link exists between child pornography and future acts of
child sexual abuse, because the causes of such crimes are more complicated than the mere viewing
of pictures. For a discussion of the "Jake Baker" controversy, see infra notes 305-11 and
accompanying text. Regarding that issue, one commentator stated, "I do not believe that words of
violence lead to acts of violence. If they did, Stephen King would be a man to worry about."
Fantasy Can Be Foolish but Its not a FederalCase, THE HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Mar. 14, 1995, at
3.
304. In demonstrating how our justice system requires an actus reus in order for a crime to
occur, criminal law professors often begin hypotheticals by assuming that the state has the power
to read the thoughts and fantasies of its citizens. See supra note 303 for a definition of actus reus.
The question would then be whether a person who fantasizes about harming another ought to be
punished, before he or she acts on that fantasy. Besides assuming a fool-proof scheme exists to tap
into a person's thoughts and see a person's actual fantasies (as opposed to speculating on a person's
thoughts, based on his or her writings, speech, or actions), this hypothetical classroom question also
seems to assume that it is only a matter of time before a person acts on a fantasy. For an analysis
as to whether this second assumption has any basis in fact, see infra note 307 and accompanying text
and supra note 303.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1997

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 32, No. 1 [1997], Art. 7

254
Usenet.2

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32

Although the student was not actually prosecuted for the content

of his stories,'

the stories alone prompted an investigation by the university

and eventual criminal prosecution for a related matter. This case raised many
important legal issues relevant to current technological advancements, including
privacy issues related to Internet use, free speech issues, and line-drawing issues
regarding the regulation of one's sexual fantasies, when those fantasies are made
public.'
The issue that disturbed many people about this case was that the student
used his classmate's real name in his story. 3°s Many Internet "regulars"'
who strongly support free speech denounced the student for that reason, as the
classmate was seen by many to be victimized by the mere textual account, even
though she had never even known that the stories existed until the controversy
became public on the campus. 310 This case involved the use of a person's
name and description in a sexual fantasy, but the response would undoubtedly
be similar, if not stronger, had the student accompanied his story with computer-

305. The student, Abraham Jacob Alkhabaz, used the pseudonym "Jake Baker" when he posted
his stories on Usenet (a part of the Internet consisting of on-line newsgroups, which contain
messages and files "posted" by the general Internet community; see generally supra note 29), which
involved the detailed rape, torture, and murder of the classmate. Internet Sex Story Charges
Dismissed, FACT ON FILE WORLD NEWS DIGEST, July 6, 1995, at G2. Alkhabaz also exchanged
e-mail with an unknown person, in which his violent fantasies were described. Id. Prosecutors
argued that the e-mail evolved from "shared fantasies to a firm plan of action," but defense lawyers
maintained that the published fantasies were protected speech. The federal district court judge
agreed with the defense, and the charges against Alkhabaz were dismissed. Computer 'Rape' Case
Thrown out by Judge, CHI. TRIB., June 22, 1995, at N4 [hereinafter Case Thrown out].
306. Case Thrown out, supra note 305, at N4.
307. U.S. District Judge Avern Cohn, who dismissed the charges against Alkhabaz, stated that
"it is not constitutionally permissible . . .to infer an intention to act on a desire from a simple
expression of the desire." Charges Against Internet Fantasy Writer Dropped, THE DETROIT NEWS,
June 22, 1995, at 1. Cohn also stated that "[tlo infer an intention to act upon the thoughts and
dreams from this language would stray far beyond the bounds of the First Amendment, and would
amount to punishing Baker for his thoughts and desires." Id.
308. See MacKinnon, supra note 159, at 1961 ("[Elven though names are only words, [Jake
Baker's] making pornography of a name was seen as part of doing real harm to a real person. We
still live in a textual world in which suddenly, if perhaps only momentarily, this injury became
visible, real.").
309. Internet regulars would be those users who spend a significant amount of time accessing
the Internet's resources, but especially those who post regularly to Internet newsgroups, frequent
"chat rooms" (virtual rooms which allow users to engage in "real-time chat" with other users around
the world; all that is required is an Internet connection and access to the "room" itself) World Wide
Web forums, or bulletin board services (BBS). See supra note 29.
310. See generallyincensedAuthor Writes ofRevenge on Internet, THE HOUSTON CHRONICLE,
Mar. 12, 1995, at A12. Tanith Tyrr, a free-lance author, wrote a violent pornographic story about
Baker in response to his story, as she was angered by his use of his classmate's real name. Id. She
argued that "[h]e invaded her privacy. That's definitely a violation of something, if only a violation
of community standards on the Net." Id.
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manipulated images of the classmate. 3 1' The fact that the student did not even
know the classmate would be irrelevant to any who saw the pictures or read the
stories; the violation would be virtual, yet just as abhorrent. The pictures would
312
seem real, and would, therefore, be real to the viewer.
Child pornography has never been proscribed on the grounds that viewing

it may cause one to molest children.313

The "protection of morals"

argument314 has not provided any basis for such regulations, unlike those laws
that deal with obscenity. 315 The mere possibility that viewing or creating
virtual child pornography on one's computer will cause one to go out and molest
children is not a reasonable governmental interest and therefore cannot provide
an adequate basis for its suppression. 1 6 Thus, any regulation based on such
grounds would be ungrounded in case law.317

311. If other Internet users sympathized with the classmate because her name was used, one
could reasonably speculate that the unauthorized use of her image would command an even greater
outrage from the community, since "a picture is worth a thousand words."
312. To allude to Senator Hatch's statement, since the viewers would not be able to tell the
difference between altered images of Alkhabaz's subject and authentic images, there would be no
difference. Hearing, supra note 32 and accompanying text. At face value, the images would appear
to be genuine, despite the fact that they would represent a fantasy existing only in Alkhabaz's mind.
Id. Of course, the real difference would exist with regard to the subject, because in real life she is
physically unharmed, but in the altered images she may be beaten or raped.
313. See generally Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990).
314. See supra notes 289-93 and accompanying text.
315. Osborne, 495 U.S. at 109-10.
316. See supra notes 289-303 and accompanying text. In addition, regulating virtual child
pornography on the sole basis of possible secondary effects will also be an ineffective way of dealing
with sexual abuse of children. See CREWDSON, supra note 61, at 247 (quoting in part Rob FreemanLongo, a researcher at Oregon State Hospital, who maintains that pornography does not make men
commit sex crimes. Freeman-Longo notes that a pedophile does not need pornography to molest
a child, as he could "look at the children's underwear section of a Sears catalogue and become
aroused.... ."). There is also the opposite conclusion: that the existence of child pornography leads
to a decrease in sexual crimes against children, by providing an outlet for pedophiles' desires.
Adelman, supra note 19, at 491. If this conclusion is accurate, then a positive reason exists for
allowing the possession of virtual child pornography, but not real child pornography, as the lesser
of two evils. Id. Real child pornography involves the sexual abuse of children, and that cannot be
permitted under any circumstances. See supra note 9. See also Branscomb, supra note 145, at
1955-56 ("If one could prove with scientifically acceptable data that sexually explicit images can
serve to satisfy rather than stimulate ... urges ... then sexually stimulating images might offer an
alternative method of satisfying sexual urges . . . ."). See supra notes 297-304.

317. In Stanley, the Supreme Court established that the government may not police the morality
of its citizens in their own homes. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 566 (1969). Although
Osborne held that the private possession of child pornography may be proscribed, it did so with
regard to the fact that such materials were illegal per se under a Ferberanalysis and were not merely
obscene (as in Stanley). Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990).
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Besides resolving the issue of proximity of danger, the government would
also need to consider the privacy issues involved with regulating the personal
possession of virtual child pornography."'
Assuming that virtual child
pornography is to be regulated as obscenity is regulated, an individual cannot be
forbidden from merely possessing the material in his own home, based on the
secondary effect argument or preserving community morals.319 Laws relating
to its distribution could include existing federal laws,32 as well as state and
local obscenity statutes.32'
Clearly the Supreme Court will need to analyze its prior case law and the
peripheral arguments such as those based on potential indirect effects of virtual
child pornography. In addition, however, the Court should consider public
policy. Virtual child pornography will very likely affect the child pornography
industry.322
How the Supreme Court chooses to treat virtual child
pornography in light of the First Amendment, therefore, becomes a matter of
great public concern.
D. Public Policy Considerations
While virtual child pornography seems real, it is not; rather, it is fantasy
and does not record any real event.3 23 Technological developments in
computer graphics will force a paradigm shift, as the reality of images will have
to be reevaluated.3 24 Continued trust of photographs will soon be naive in
light of the ease with which they can be altered. Just as early viewers of
television learned to distinguish the real from the imaginary, so must modem
viewers of pictures and images remember that the camera can lie, and they must
3
act according to the reality of our technological culture. 2
A healthy skepticism of visual images is required, or else we will not be
fully prepared to contend with those who will use that technology for depraved
purposes. This problem is seen in a contemporary science fiction novel which

318. See supra note 317.
319. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 566.
320. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252 (1996).
321. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1462 (relating to the interstate or foreign distribution of obscene
materials).
322. See supra part III and accompanying footnotes.
323. Note that real child pornography requires the sexual abuse of a child in its production.
See supra notes 9, 239-40 and accompanying text. For a background on how virtual child
pornography is produced, see supra part II.A.
324. See supra notes 159-78 and accompanying text.
325. Id. See also Bill Mahon, All the News That's Fit to Manipulate, EDITOR & PUBLISHER
MAGAZINE, Mar. 2, 1996, at 48 ("Photographs always lie. They lied about reality when the process
was invented in the 1830s and they lie with impeccable speed and accuracy 150 years later.").
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contains a passage in which a villain projects holographic images for destructive
purposes.326 The viewers of the images, unaccustomed to the sophisticated
realism of the images, assume that they are real and react accordingly, but to
their own detriment.3 27 With virtual child pornography, it is easy to assume
that what is depicted is real, and therefore, contraband. It seems like a natural
way of resolving the problem. At one time it was easy for radio listeners to
believe whatever they heard on a program to be true.328 It was easy for early
television viewers to believe that what they saw on the screen was really
happening somewhere. 2 9 But these ways of thinking were replaced with a
healthy, realistic skepticism.33° The apparent reality of still photographs will
likewise be deconstructed, and rightfully so. The blind faith in pictures will be
"
replaced with a more moderate approach to visual reality. 33
'
People tend to assume that computer-manipulated photographs and images
are "real," in that they represent a record of an actual event.33 2 This
assumption is based on the sheer power of the visual image, as well as the
public's ignorance of computer graphics technology.333 Society needs to
reevaluate this assumption in its legislation and not ignore it, despite Senator

326. GIBSON, supra note 29, at 90. In a "cyberpunk" futuristic world, the character, Peter
Riviera, would regularly project a holographic image of a scorpion onto the brake pedals of passing
motorcyclists. Id. The motorists, assuming that the image was real, would lose control of the
vehicles. Id. Clearly, there is a danger in relying too heavily on a visual "reality" which can be
altered at will by those possessing the technology. See infra note 328 (explaining how a distortion
of radio "reality" in the 1930s led to mass hysteria).
327. GIBSON, supra note 29, at 90.
328. This paradigm resulted in the "War of the Worlds" radio scare on October 31, 1938.
Orson Welles broadcast a radio play based on the novel by H.G. Wells, in which invaders from
Mars ravaged the countryside. Listeners did not realize that the broadcast was a work of fiction,
since Welles appeared to be making a news report (although he had apparently announced that the
piece was a dramatization at the beginning of the broadcast). The result was nationwide panic.
Boo, TIME, Nov. 7, 1938, at 40. Fifteen people were treated for shock at St. Michael's Hospital
in Newark, New Jersey. Id. The present day radio listener is of course less susceptible to the
power of radio, as the medium has become commonplace. Gleason L. Archer, BIG BUSINESS AND
RADIO 418 (1939). The Martian attack play could be seen not only as testimony to the oratory skills
of Orson Welles, but also as a warning to the radio industry of the dangers of broadcasting a play
of such high-powered drama. Id. at 418-19. The radio play caused widespread hysteria in such a
short time; listeners apparently did not bother to verify the source of the information of the Martian
attack before giving way to panic. Id. The trust in the new technology (the radio) was almost
absolute, and therefore listeners presumed the validity of the broadcasts. It may very well have been
inconceivable to those listeners that the broadcast was fiction. To allude once more to Senator
Hatch, it sounded real, so it was real. See Hearing, supra note 32.
329. Gardner, supra note 161, at 91-121.
330. Archer, supra note 328, at 418 (stating that as a medium becomes more commonplace,
its power over its audience diminishes).
331. Id.
332. See supra notes 205-08.
333. Grantham, supra note 205, at 224-26 (emphasizing the visual nature of our culture).
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Hatch's declaration to the contrary. 3" On its face, virtual child pornography
335
The
appears in every regard to be real child pornography, yet it is not.
dilemma which virtual child pornography presents for law enforcement officers
needs to be appropriately addressed in light of practical issues of public policy,
as well as the First Amendment.
Child pornography statutes need to be clear about how they are to approach
the issue of virtual child pornography. Although child pornography includes
only those visual depictions of real, sexually abused children, 336 any image
which could reasonably be thought to be child pornography by a law
enforcement officer could be the basis of a prosecution. Thus, even if virtual
child pornography is found to remain within the protection of the First
Amendment, some virtual child pornographers, like Johnson, will find
This result would occur because it would be
themselves in court. 337
impossible for a police officer to tell if the images involved the sexual abuse of
a real child. 338 When an image is so realistic that it appears on its face to 3be
39
child pornography, the presumption should be in favor of the prosecutor.
A defendant should have the burden of proving that no real children were
sexually abused in the production of the image, and that the image is not,
therefore, child pornography. Thus, under the following proposed amendment
to the federal child pornography legislation,' a limited affirmative defense
would be available for those defendants who could prove to the fact-finder that
the image is virtual, rather than real, child pornography.3"
V.

PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE FEDERAL
CHILD PORNOGRAPHY STATUTE

Under the current child pornography statutes of many states, 342 the burden
of proof rests on the prosecutor to prove that the images in question are child

334. See supra text accompanying note 32.
335. Supra parts II.A, IV.A, and IV.B and accompanying notes and supra notes 9, 239-41.
336. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764-65 (1982).
337. See supra part I (discussing Johnson, the hypothetical person who produces only virtual
child pornography, using his scanner and computer).
338. See supra note 42.
339. If the burden of proof were allowed to remain as it is in the statute, it would become
impossible to prosecute any real child pornographers. See infra note 361 (testimony of Bruce Taylor
before the Senate Judiciary Committee). A shift in the burden of proof, therefore, is narrowlydrafted and necessary to resolve the current problem with the statute. For a defense of the proposed
amendment to 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252, see infra part V.
340. See infra part V.
341. See infra part V.
342. E.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-20.1 (West 1996); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.730
(Michie 1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5a-1 (1996). For a nearly complete list of state statutes
relating to child pornography, see supra note 58.
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pornography. 3 Thus, in the case of Jones, a state would have to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the pictures that he possessed were child
pornography; that is, that they visually depicted real children engaging in sexual
activities.'
Under the federal law, a defendant would be unable to present any
evidence that the material in question was virtual, and not real, child
pornography, because the artificial pornography would be treated as the real
material. 5 Thus, Johnson would have no affirmative defense, even though
he did nothing more than create sexual images on his computer, and even though
he did not sexually abuse any real children. "
This Note's proposed amendment to the federal law shifts the burden of
proof to the defendant, requiring him to prove, by clear and convincing
evidence, 4 7 that the material in question is merely virtual child
pomographyY 8 Images which appear on their faces to depict real children

343. For example, a prosecutor in Illinois must prove to a fact-finder that the defendant had
knowledge of the minority status of the pornography subject. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/I 1-20.1 (a)(1)
(West 1996) (requiring that the subject of the child pornography be, in fact, a "child whom [the
defendant] knows or reasonably should know to be under the age of 18"). In addition, Illinois law
provides an affirmative defense to defendants who have a reasonable belief that the subject has
reached the age of eighteen. Id. at 5/11-20. 1(b)(1).
344. See supra part I. As pedophiles become more and more computer-savvy, it will become
impossible to convict them under state law, because the pedophiles could always raise defend by
stressing the prosecutor's burden of proving that a real child was used to create the picture. See
supra note 343. Naturally, this will be difficult to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, considering
the growing sophistication of computer graphics technology. Campolo, supra note 31, at 735-36.
In the absence of an identifiable victim, it is often impossible for a prosecutor to prove the age of
the child in the photograph. CREWDSON, supra note 61, at 245. Physiologists might be able to
testify that the pornography subject in question had not yet reached majority, but such testimony
does not ensure a conviction. Id.
345. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252 (1996). For a more detailed description of the Child Pornography
Prevention Act, see supra notes 96-98.
346. See supra notes 96-98. The federal amendment provides no affirmative defense for those
defendants who can prove that they, like the hypothetical Johnson, did not use real children when
creating their virtual child pornography. See supra part I.
347. The standard of "clear and convincing" evidence is a more exacting measure of persuasion
than "preponderance of the evidence."
CHARLES TILFORD MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE 575-76 (John W. Strong et al. eds., 4th ed. 1992) [hereinafter MCCORMICK]. The clear
and convincing standard is used, in part, for miscellaneous types of claims and defenses where there
is thought to be a special danger of deception, or where the court considers that the particular type
of claim should be disfavored on policy grounds. Id. at 576.
348. For example, a defendant could demonstrate his or her skill in manipulating computergenerated images, and an expert, appointed by the defendant or the court, could analyze the
defendant's skill. For a background on how a defendant could create such images, see supra part
II.A. Or, the defendant could testify verbally as to how he or she created the image, or watched
it being created, and the fact-finder could determine whether this testimony is credible. But, if the
defendant offered no evidence as to the origin of the image, the image would be presumed to be real
child pornography. For a comparison of this affirmative defense to the insanity defense, in which
all defendants are presumed to be sane, but allowed to disprove this presumption, see infra note 387.
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engaging in sexual activities should carry a rebuttable presumption that they are,
in fact, child pornography for purposes of the statute. 9 The defendant would
bear the burden of rebutting this presumption for each image which he or she
is found to possess, and if the defendant is so able, he or she could not be
convicted of possessing child pornography.3 10 Thus, the statute would be
amended to realistically address the problem of virtual child pornography by
allowing a limited, implied affirmative defense for those defendants who have
not possessed actual child pornography. This proposed amendment will keep
while staying
child pornography legislation up-to-date with new technology,
35 1
narrowly-drafted enough to pass a constitutional attack.
This affirmative defense is required in order to recognize the inherent
differences between real child pornography and virtual child pornography .
The proposed amendment to current legislation is based on a balance between
the defendant's rights under the First Amendment and his or her right to
privacy, and the state's interest in preventing the production and distribution of
real child pornography. The defense would only apply to those defendants that
would be able to rebut the presumption for each picture that they possess. The
law will be directed toward those defendants such as Johnson, who have a few
virtual pornography images on their computers that they created themselves. It
would allow for reasonable freedom of thought and expression, while leaving the
government with sufficient power to prosecute those pornographers who are an
actual danger to children.

349. The presumption would be rebuttable by clear and convincing evidence, which would serve
to shift the burden of proof. But see Coleman v. Darden, 595 F.2d 533, 536 (Colo. 1979)
(reasoning that irrebuttable presumptions against criminal defendants should be discouraged because
they prevent individualized determinations of fact). See infra notes 381-87 and accompanying text.
350. See infra notes 381-87 and accompanying text. See also MCCORMICK, supra note 347,
at 576.
351. A defendant could attack the constitutionality of the legislation on First Amendment
grounds and could assert that the Ferberdefinition of child pornography does not include virtual
child pornography. See supra notes 239-41. But because this amended statute would not strictly
treat virtual child pornography as real child pornography, it should be upheld by the Supreme Court.
See infra notes 381-87 and accompanying text.
352. For an analysis of why virtual child pornography is different from actual child
pornography, see supra parts II.A, IV.A and IV.B, and particularly supra notes 239-41.
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A. Proposed Amendment to 18 U.S.C. §2252353
[Note: the author proposes that section 2252 be amended to include the
following language as Subsections (a)(5) and (a)(6).]
§ 2252.

Certain Activities Relating to Material Involving the Sexual

Exploitation of Minors:
(5) Any film, videotape, photograph or other similar visual reproduction or
depiction by computer which appearson itsface to depict a child engagedin any
activity described in this section shall be presumed to be childpornographyfor

purposes of this Section.
(6)(A) It shall be an affirmative defense to a charge of child pornography that
each subject of the film, videotape, photograph or other similar visual

reproduction or depiction by computer was not a real child under the age of
eighteen (18) engaged in sexual activity, but was, rather, a computer-created
image of an imaginary person, or a computer-manipulated image of a real

person, or that the child was, in fact, eighteen (18) years of age or older.
(B) The defendant shall bear the burden of rebutting, by clear and convincing
evidence, the presumption contained in subsection (a)(5) so as to rely on this
affirmative defense.
B. Commentary
This proposed amendment to the federal child pornography statute would
solve the problem of the prosecutor's burden of proof. Under current federal
legislation, if an image appears to be child pornography, then an irrebuttable

353. The original text of the federal child pornography legislation, before it was amended by
the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, read as follows:
Certain activities relating to material involving the sexual exploitation of minors
(a) Any person who(1) knowingly transports or ships in interstate or foreign commerce by any means
including by computer or mails, any visual depiction, if(A) the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in
sexually explicit conduct; and
(B) such visual depiction is of such conduct . . . [following subsections relate to
secondary distributors, and buildings used for distribution] . . . shall be punished as
provided in subsection (b) of this section.
(b)(l) Whoever violates . . . paragraph (1), (2) or (3) of subsection (a) shall be fined
under this title or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both, but if such person has
a prior conviction under this chapter ... such person shall be fined . . . and imprisoned
for not less than five years nor more than 30 years.
18 U.S.C.A. § 2252 (West 1996).
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presumption is created that the material is child pornography.'
This
presumption eliminates the issue of whether the prosecutor can prove that the

material actually involved the sexual exploitation of a minor, or if it was a
computer-manipulated image instead. It simply does not matter anymore at that
point because, under the current federal legislation as amended,355 both are
treated exactly the same. 6
In contrast, under many current state laws,3"7 the prosecutor has the

burden of proving that the pornographic material in question depicts a child
below a certain age engaging in sexual conduct.35 Thus, a pornographer is
given the benefit of the doubt and cannot be convicted if the state fails to
establish that a real minor is accurately depicted in the image as engaging in
sexual activities. So far, this apparent loophole has not benefited pornographers
much, because the technology is not yet widespread.35 9 An average, nonexpert is presumed to know the difference between a real child and a virtual
image of a child.' ° But soon, it will not be so easy for the prosecutor to
convict a suspected pornographer."
Each defendant would have a built-in

354. See supra notes 96-98.
355. See supra notes 96-98.
356. See supra notes 96-98.
357. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-20.1 (West 1996).
358. Id. See also 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252(a)(1). The prosecutor must show that the defendant
knew or reasonably should have known that the subject was under the age of eighteen. Id. See also
CREWDSON, supra note 61, at 245. Before it was amended, the federal law (18 U.S.C.A. § 2252)
required actual knowledge or reckless disregard for a performer's minority in order for a conviction
to be valid. United States v. Burian, 19 F.3d 188, 191 (5th Cir. 1994).
359. See generally United States v. Nolan, 818 F.2d 1015 (1st Cir. 1987). In this case, the
defendant appealed his conviction for receiving child pornography through the mail by arguing that
the government should have been required to prove that the photographs in question were truly
representations of minors engaging in sexual conduct. Id. at 1016. The pictures on their faces
appeared to be child pornography, and the state presented pediatric testimony that the subjects were
minors. Id. at 1017. But Nolan claimed that a photography expert should have been required. Id.
The First Circuit held that it is within the range of ordinary competence for laypersons to determine
if they are viewing a real photograph, and not an artistic rendition. Id. at 1017-18. The court
upheld the trial court's decision to convict the defendant, stating that the trial judge could reasonably
infer that the subjects of the pictures were real children, since photos are taken of something, and
not generated by an artist. Id. at 1018. The court in this case did not consider computer graphics
technology as an issue, and the defendant did not raise the issue, instead arguing that the subjects
of the pictures could have been wax dummies or other simulated images. Id.
360. Id. at 1017-18.
361. Bruce Taylor has effectively explained this legal problem:
If the Government must continue to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [images] are indeed
actual depictions of an actual minor engaging in the sex portrayed, then there could be a builtin reasonable doubt argument in every child exploitation pornography prosecution. The
inability to find ... the source of all child porn pictures, real or apparent, plus the ability of
technology to confound both the eye and any definitive analysis, makes such proof 'difficult',
if not impossible ....

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol32/iss1/7

Friel: Porn by Any Other Name? A Constitutional Alternative to Regulatin

19971

PORN BY ANY OTHER NAME?

263

argument that the images are not child pornography; 362 it would be difficult
for the prosecutor to prove otherwise. The burden of proof should shift to the
pornographer to prove that he used his computer, and not a real child, to create
the image.'
The Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 rests on the assumption that
no difference exists between a depiction of an actual child, who has really
engaged in sexual intercourse, and virtual child pornography, which involves
mere fantasy. 3'
This assumption undermines the emotional trauma of the
child victim who is sexually abused in the former case. It also evades the real
legal issue of whether the category of child pornography includes computermanipulated images which do not require the sexual abuse of 'children to
produce.o
The Supreme Court was clear in Ferber'" that the category of
proscribable child pornography is a narrow one. Although the threat to law
enforcement that virtual child pornography presents cannot be ignored, the issue
is not resolved by merely equating virtual child pornography with real child
pornography. Aside from being unconstitutional for reasons stated above, the
current federal solution367 is superficial and unrealistic, because it primarily
assumes that a graphical work of fiction is just as real as traditional child
pornography, which has always been a visual record of sexual abuse.'
Clearly, the prosecutor's current burden of proof is unacceptable in light
of the difficulty of proving that a sophisticated child pornography image
involved the sexual abuse of a real child, and is not virtual pornography.3 69

Hearing, supra note 32, at 895 (testimony of Bruce Taylor). This testimony relates to the Child
Pornography Prevention Act of 1996. See supra notes 32, 96-98, 344.
362. Hearing, supra note 32, at 895 (testimony of Bruce Taylor).
363. Shifting the burden of proof would make clear public policy sense, because the
pornographer, not the prosecutor, is in a better position to know how the material was created and
to have access to any relevant evidence. See MCCORMICK, supra note 347, at 576. Even if the
pornographer obtained the material second-hand through the Internet, or in person from another
pornographer, he or she should be required under law to inquire as to the specifics of the
production. Id.
364. Hearing, supra note 32, at 894 (testimony of Bruce Taylor that "if you can't tell the
difference, then there isn't any difference").
365. For a discussion of the practical and legal differences between the real child pornography
and virtual child pornography, see supra parts II.A, IV.A and IV.B, and supra notes 9, 139-41.
366. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982).
367. See supra notes 96-98.
368. See supra note 9.
369. Such a burden of proof, combined with the current state of computer graphics technology
alone, makes it theoretically almost impossible to convict a child pornographer. See supra note 361.
As technology becomes more advanced, which it certainly will, the odds against prosecutors will
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Pedophiles will soon learn that the best way to avoid a conviction is to merely
claim that their entire collection consists of virtual pornography, and therefore
force the prosecutor to prove otherwise. 37' This would, in effect, frustrate the
prosecution of all child pornographers, and allow most to go free, if they are
even prosecuted at all. 37'
If all apparent child pornography 37 is automatically treated as virtual
child pornography, the result will be even worse than if it is all treated as real
child pornography as under the federal law. Law enforcement officers will have
enormous difficulty enforcing anti-pornography laws, and those laws would soon
be rendered useless. 3'
While "instant-photographs" 374 will almost always
be presumed to be real child pornography,375 any images found on a computer
will be more ambiguous. Law enforcement officers should not have to bring
photography and computer graphics experts into each child pornography
investigation.
To avoid this probability, the federal child pornography statute must be
updated to close this loophole. However, an amendment must satisfy the
constitutional requirements, by distinguishing virtual child pornography from
that unprotected speech in Ferber,376 and not merely introducing a shotgun
approach to the situation. The issue of virtual child pornography cannot be
ignored, but the current federal solution should be avoided in favor of more
narrow legislation. 3'
A shift in the burden of proof on the issue of whether

increase. See supra note 361. Clearly, this loophole needs to be closed before habitual child
pornographers are allowed to escape responsibility for their crimes.
370. Hearing, supra note 32, at 895 (testimony of Bruce Taylor).
371. Id.
372. "Apparent child pornography" would include all sexual images of children, whether real
or virtual child pornography, because it would theoretically be impossible to tell just by looking at
the image into which class it would fall. This would be a question for the trier of fact to determine,
assuming that the defendant raised the affirmative defense. See supra note 348.
373. See Johnson, supra note 32, at 329.
374. "Instant-photographs" would include those pictures such as Polaroids, where the pictures
are developed instantly inside the camera, and where the film does not have to be removed to be
developed. See infra note 375.
375. Most child pornographers use their own developing equipment so that their images are not
seen by outsiders. CREWDSON, supra note 61, at 245. If a Polaroid or similar photograph is
discovered, the defendant will have a more difficult time establishing his defense, due to the
difficulties of altering such instant photographs. In contrast, a defendant will more easily prove that
a computer image is virtual pornography, because such images are easily manipulated with computer
graphics software. See supra part II.A.
376. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
377. See supra text accompanying note 353 (proposed amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 2252).
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an image in question is real should be effective because it will force the
defendant to reveal evidence to substantiate his or her affirmative defense.378
As technology advances, law-makers must stay current and adapt to changes.
This proposed amendment to the federal child pornography legislation is
constitutional under the First Amendment. By providing an affirmative defense
to those pornographers who do not sexually abuse real children when creating
the pornography, the amendment is narrowly drafted to the point that it will not
affect constitutionally protected speech. The proposed legislation is designed to
ensure that real child pornographers, those who sexually molest children, will
not escape criminal liability by relying on a loophole which computer graphics
technology has created.379 Since real child pornography is not constitutionally
protected, a" the above proposal should pass constitutional muster under a First
Amendment analysis.
The proposed amendment is also constitutional in light of the Fifth
Amendment and due plfocess rights of a defendant in a criminal proceeding. 38'
Forcing the defendant to bear the burden of proving to a trier of fact, by clear
and convincing evidence, that the pornographic material in question was not
created by sexually abusing a real child is not a denial of his or her civil
383
rights .3a Like other affirmative defenses provided to criminal defendants,
including the insanity defense, 3" the limited affirmative defense in the above

378. See supra note 348.
379. Quitmer, supra note 32, at 74.
380. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764.
381. See generally U.S. CONST. amends. VI and XIV. Criminal defendants have a fundamental
right to a fair trial under the Fourteenth Amendment, and a presumption of innocence is a basic
component of the fair trial protection. Id. See also Gatto v. Hoke, 809 F. Supp. 1030 (E.D.N.Y.
1992). A criminal defendant is entitled to a presumption of innocence that can be overcome only
by proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Orena, 811 F. Supp. 819, 826
(E.D.N.Y. 1992). Irrebuttable presumptions against criminal defendants are disfavored by courts
because they preclude individualized determinations of fact upon which substantial rights or
obligations may depend. Coleman v. Darden, 595 F.2d 533 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 927. See also NLRB v. Heyman, 541 F.2d 796 (9th Cir. 1976) (a civil case holding that a
statute does not afford due process if it creates a presumption which operates to deny a fair
opportunity to rebut). However, the amendment proposed above provides a rebuttable presumption,
and each criminal case would involve individual determinations by the trier of fact.
382. See supra note 381 for an overview of these rights.
383. For example, duress is an affirmative defense, and the defendant has the burden of proving
the essential elements by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Christian, 843 F. Supp.
1000, 1004 (D. Md. 1994). Entrapment is also an affirmative defense, with the burden of proof
resting on the criminal defendant. United States v. Stuart, 923 F.2d 607 (8th Cir. 1991).
384. Federal law provides the following insanity defense:
§ 17 Insanity defense
(a) Affirmative defense. It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under any federal
statute that, at the time of the commission of the acts constituting the offense, the
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proposal arises from a rebuttable presumption. 38 The law can presume all
persons to be sane, 3' although defendants are to be given the chance to rebut
that presumption by an affirmative defense, and establish their own insanity."
With regard to a pornographic image which appears on its face to be child
pornography, it is not unconstitutional to presume the material to be real child
pornography and not virtual child pornography."' In addition, as a practical
matter, it could be impossible to determine, just by looking at the image,
whether a real child was sexually abused in its production. The only way to
determine the factual issue of whether the material is child pornography would
be to present evidence as to the origin of the material. 389 The defendant would
be the best source of such evidence, just as a defendant would be the only
source of evidence as to whether he or she was insane, for purposes of the
insanity defense. 390 A rebuttable presumption in favor of the prosecution on
the issue of how the pornographic materials were created, therefore, is
"
'
acceptable and not unduly unfair to a criminal defendant. 39

defendant, as a result of a severe mental disease or defect, was unable to appreciate the
nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts. Mental disease or defect does not
otherwise constitute an offense.
(b) Burden of proof. The defendant has the burden of proving the defense of insanity
by clear and convincing evidence.
18 U.S.C.A. § 17 (West Supp. 1996)
385. See supra note 381 and accompanying text.
386. Branscomb v. Norris, 47 F.3d 258 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that unless there is some
contrary indication, state and federal trial judges may presume that defendants are competent).
387. Courts have upheld statutes that require criminal defendants to establish their insanity as
an affirmative defense to a crime. See generally United States v. Abou-Kassem, 78 F.3d 161 (5th
Cir. 1996); United States v. Cartagena-Carrasquillo, 70 F.3d 706 (1st Cir. 1995); United States v.
Byrd, 834 F.2d 145, 147 (8th Cir. 1987); United States v. Amos, 803 F.2d 419 (8th Cir. 1986)
(holding that there is no due process violation in the insanity affirmative defense); Williams v.
Vasquez, 817 F. Supp. 1443, 1462 (E.D. Cal. 1993) (relying on CAL. EViD. CODE § 115.522 in
requiring a criminal defendant to prove his insanity defense by a preponderance of the evidence).
In addition, the clear and convincing proof standard has been found to be constitutional for the
federal insanity defense. United States v. Freeman, 804 F.2d 1574, 1576 (11th Cir. 1986). See
also supra note 347.
388. See supra notes 381-87 and accompanying text.
389. Hearing, supra note 32, at 895 (testimony of Bruce Taylor).
390. Id. See also supra notes 347, 361.
391. See supra notes 381-87 and accompanying text.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Federal law regulating child pornography must keep in pace with
technology. While the recent amendment to the federal statute purports to
address the issue of virtual child pornography, it fails to resolve that issue in a
constitutional and realistic manner. Many state laws are simply not up-to-date
in light of current computer graphics technology. The proposed amendment to
the federal statute is a narrowly-drafted solution that recognizes the technological
changes in the child pornography industry and thereby will better combat those
pornographers who sexually exploit children.
Samantha L. Friel
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